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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to
promulgate criminal sentencing guidelines for the federal courts.1 The first task
of the Commission was the development of sentencing guidelines for
individuals. 2 When these were completed in 1987, the Commission began to
formulate guidelines for organizations. The fourth and final draft of the organizational guidelines became law on November 1, 1991.3
The new organizational guidelines take an explicitly "carrot and stick"
approach to sentencing. 4 Under section 8C2, calculating the appropriate fine
for an organizational offender begins with the determination of a "base fine"
chosen to reflect the seriousness of the offense. 5 The base fine is then
adjusted according to a series of aggravating and mitigating factors: the
participation of authority personnel, the history of the organization, cooperation

with law enforcement authorities, and the presence or absence of a program
to prevent and detect crime.6 In part, these factors are intended to provide an
incentive for organizations to "strengthen internal mechanisms for deterring,
detecting and reporting criminal conduct by their agents and employees. '7 But
an additional result of the Guidelines is to make corporate punishment
proportional to what would, in an individual, be called "culpability": the deliberateness of the offense, the extent of the offender's involvement, and the
offender's "character." 8 Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly use the term
"culpability" and refer to the list of aggravating and mitigating factors as the
organization's "culpability score." 9

1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, §§ 211-239, 98
Stat. 1837, 1936, 1987-2040 (1984).
2. See United States Sentencing Comm'n, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
(Nov. 1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
3. 50 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1139 (Nov. 6, 1991).

4.

United States Sentencing Commission Draft Guidelines for Organizational

Defendents, Crim L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48 at 2001, 2002 (Oct. 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Draft

Guidelines].
5. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4.
6. Id. § 8C2.5.
7. 1990 Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, at 2002. See also PrinciplesAdopted by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to Guide the Drafting of the November 1990 Draft Organizational
Guidelines [hereinafter Guiding Principles],reprinted in UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR
ORGANIZATIONS, A-3 (August 30, 1991) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. These
principles were developed to guide the formulation of the 1990 Draft Guidelines,supra note 4,
but, as their inclusion in the Supplementary Report suggests, they also informed the final
version of the guidelines.
8. The Introductory Commentary to the organizational guidelines states that the fine
range "should be based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization."
U.S.S.G. ch.8, intro. cmt. See also Guiding Principles,supranote 7, at A-2, A-3 ("Mitigating
factors should be designed to reduce fines for two primary reasons: to recognize an
organization's relative degree of culpability, and to encourage desirable organizational behavior.
... For example, the guidelines should permit an organization a reduction if it demonstrates that
the offense was caused by a rogue employee rather than at the direction or with the tacit approval
of 'management.'")
9. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5.
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Although the Guidelines are applicable to all "organizations," 10 they
were designed with corporations in mind, and it is on corporations that they
are expected to have their greatest impact." Yet the Guidelines' use of
organizational culpability represents a departure from the traditional principles
of substantive corporate criminal law. The dominant aim of corporate criminal
law has been deterrence rather than retribution, rehabilitation, or incapacitation. This has meant that culpability has played a relatively minor role. To be
sure, courts have had to develop theories of corporate mens rea in order to
hold corporations liable for crimes requiring inten-t. But these theories are the
products of necessity rather than careful analysis or conceptual rigor; they
stem less from a belief in the importance of corporate culpability than from the
perceived need to extend criminal liability to corporations.12 The Guidelines, in
contrast, employ a well-considered, theoretically satisfying conception of
corporate culpability that is driven by the purposes of sentencing set out in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2): just punishment, adequate deterrence, protection of the
public, rehabilitation of the offender, proportionality with the seriousness of the
offense, and the need to promote respect for the law. 13
This Article examines the use of corporate culpability in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and addresses three major questions: In light of the
traditional unimportance of culpability in corporate criminal law, is corporate
culpability an appropriate concern of the Guidelines? If so, how is corporate
culpability best conceptualized? Finally, how do the Guidelines understand
corporate culpability, and how close do they come to embodying this most
satisfying theory? Part I of the Article discusses the principal reasons why
culpability has been important at the trial and sentencing of individual criminals, and argues that similar reasons justify concern with culpability in the
sentencing of corporate offenders. Although culpability is not the only important factor in corporate sentencing, Part I concludes, it is a legitimate concern
of the Guidelines. Part II sets out three alternative conceptions of corporate
culpability, those implicit in the two prevailing theories of corporate criminal
liability-the doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine of Section 2.07
of the Model Penal Code-and a third conception that has received considerable support from scholars of corporate crime. Part II argues that it is this
third conception, termed the "corporate character theory," that provides the
most adequate understanding of corporate culpability, and that this theory is
particularly well-suited for use in the sentencing of organizational criminals.
Finally, Part III explores the use of culpability by the organizational guidelines
themselves, and contends that they employ a conception of corporate culpability that is closely related to the corporate character theory. In addition, it
attempts to show how the adoption of the corporate character theory allows

10. The guidelines define "organization" to include "corporations, partnerships,
associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated
organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and nonprofit organizations." Id.
§ 8Al1, cmt. n.l.
11. Michael K. Block, Guest Editor's Observations,3 FED. SENT. R. 115 (Nov./Dec.,

1990).

12. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
13. These are the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (1988) as recounted in Guiding
Principles,supra note 7, at A-3. Section 3553(a)(3) itself uses slightly different language.
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the Guidelines to pursue a wider range of sentencing aims than is traditional in
the sentencing of corporations.
Although this Article argues that culpability is a legitimate consideration
in corporate criminal sentencing, it does not contend that it is the only factor,
or even that it trumps all others. Ultimately, the success of the organizational
guidelines depends not merely on their treatment of culpability, but on their
ability to achieve the entire range of sentencing goals. In some cases,
achievement of these goals may require that corporate culpability be ignored.
This paper does not attempt to determine whether the Guidelines in fact
accomplish all the objectives of corporate sentencing. Its aim is more modest:
to show that the Sentencing Commission's deference to corporate culpability
is not misplaced, and that, to the extent that culpability is important, the
Guidelines accurately assess it.

I. CULPABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Culpability has been defined as "the degree to which [an offender] may
justly be held to blame for the consequences or risks of his act[s]."' 14 In individual criminal law, culpability has traditionally played a formal role at two distinct stages of the criminal justice process. 15 At the trial stage, factfinders are
generally required to decide whether the defendant possessed the level of
culpability necessary for conviction of the crime. At the sentencing stage,
judges frequently attempt to determine the degree of the offender's culpability
in order to assign a sentence proportional to it. Culpability is not a factor in
every conviction or every sentence. 16 Moreover, it may play a role at one
stage and not the other. 17 Generally, however, an assessment of culpability
has been important at both the trial and the sentencing of individual offenders.
But should culpability play a role in corporate criminal law? At first
blush, it is not clear that corporations can be "justly held to blame" for their
acts at all. Even if they can, corporate culpability is likely to differ in significant
ways from its individual counterpart. This section briefly examines the reasons
for the importance of culpability in the trial and sentencing of individuals, and
argues that the same rationales justify attention to culpability in corporate
criminal law. The section contends that although corporations cannot be culpable in the same way that individuals can, there is a sense in which they may

14.

ANDREW VON HIRScH, DOING JUsTIcE 80(1976).

15. These are not the only points at which culpability plays a role; they are simply the
points at which the role of culpability is formalized. Culpability may also be important to a
prosecutor's decision to bring a criminal case or to the decision to accept a plea bargain.
16. No finding of culpability is required for strict liability crimes, for example. Strict
liability is often described as "liability without fault." Similarly, culpability need not be given a
role at the sentencing stage. For example, for some time people believed that the key question in
sentencing was how likely the offender was to commit another crime, and culpability was
virtually ignored. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
17. The question of whether culpability is a necessary condition of punishment is distinct
from the question of how punishment should be distributed once the decision to punish has been
made. For example, it would be possible to convict both a knowing offender and an inadvertent
offender of a strict liability crime, but to give the inadvertent offender a more lenient sentence
because he or she is less culpable. Conversely, it would be possible to convict only those whose
violations of a law are purposeful, knowing, or reckless, but to give both purposeful and
reckless violators the same sentence.
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be held to blame for the criminal acts of their agents. Corporate culpability is,
therefore, a legitimate concern of the Sentencing Commission.
A. Culpabiity at the TrialStage

At the trial stage, culpability is usually equated with the mens rea, or
guilty mind, of the defendant. The principle that mens rea is a necessary prerequisite for punishment-what H.L.A. Hart calls the "principle of responsibility"1--has a long and venerable history in Anglo-American law. Hart argues
that "[a]ll civilized penal systems make liability to punishment for at any rate
serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that the person to be punished
has done the outward act of a crime, but on his having done it in a certain
state of ...mind or will."'19 The principle of responsibility is reflected in the
requirement that the prosecution prove mens rea, and in the availability of
certain excuses-such as insanity, diminished capacity, duress, or necessityto negate mens rea and defeat liability. 20
As the proliferation of strict liability offenses attests, the principle of
responsibility is not absolute, and some commentators see the growth of strict
liability as a repudiation of the traditional link between culpability and punishment. 21 But strict liability offenses may simply be special cases, occasions-in
which the importance of culpability is outweighed by other factors fundamental to the criminal law. Traditionally, strict liability has been reserved for a
special class of "public welfare offenses" 22 which carry a small penalty and no
moral stigma. The scope of this class of offenses has expanded, but the
Supreme Court recently made clear in Liparota v. United States23 that it still
regards strict liability crimes as exceptions to the general rule of adherence to
the principle of responsibility. Quoting Morisette v. United States, the Court
said:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
and duty of the normal individual to
human will and a consequent ability
24
choose between good and evil.

Omission of the mental element of an offense has been upheld, the Court
explained, where a statute "rendered criminal a type of conduct that a rea18. H. L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONsIBILrrY 181 (1970).
19. Id. at 114.
20. The Model Penal Code sets out iour of these guilty mental states and establishes a
presumption that a defendant is not guilty of an offense unless he acted with the required mental
state with respect to each material element of the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3)
(1962).
21. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Crininal"?:Reflections on
the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 201, 221 (1991).
Coffee argues that "a theory may be on the verge of acceptance that effectively severs [the
traditional] linkage between blameworthiness and criminal punishment." Id.
22. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933);
Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952).
23. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
24. Id. at 425 (quoting Morisette, 342 U.S. at 250-51 (Jackson, J.)). The Morisette
court had continued, "[a] relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful
act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to .......
Morisette, 342 U.S. at 250-51 (Jackson, J.).
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sonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may
seriously threaten the community's health or safety." 25 But strict liability
statutes have a "generally disfavored status"; 26 faced with a statute that does
not provide explicitly for strict liability, the Court will refuse to impose it.
The principle that culpability is a necessary condition for punishment is
most closely associated with a retributive theory of punishment. If the aim of
punishment is to express communal blame and to give the offender his or her
"just deserts," then culpability is obviously central. A person who is not culpable is not to blame and thus does not "deserve" to be punished. But the
principle of responsibility has been endorsed even by scholars who hold a utilitarian theory of punishment. Herbert Packer, for example, argues that abandoning the principle would eliminate an important source of the deterrent
efficacy of the criminal law. Criminal law deters not merely by its crude in terrorem effect on would-be criminals, Packer contends, but also by its ability to
create "conscious and unconscious moralizing and habit-forming effects" on
the law-abiding public that "go far beyond the crassness of a narrowly conceived deterrence." 27 This ability, in turn, depends on adherence to the general
rule that culpability is a necessary prerequisite for punishment:
If it is not thought enough of a justification that the law be fair, the
argument may seem appealing that a criminal law system cannot
attract and retain the respect of its most important constituents-the
habitually law-abiding-unless it is seen to be fair. And ...
[the] simplest meaning [of fairness] is that no one should be subjected to punishment without having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his
28
culpability.
In a slightly different version of this argument, Packer contends that
much of the deterrent value of criminal sanctions lies in the "stigma" of moral

blameworthiness they confer on the offender. But, Packer argues, criminal
sanctions only carry such stigma if they are generally reserved for the
culpable. 29 If people who are not culpable are frequently subjected to criminal
sanctions, the association of the sanctions with stigma will eventually erode,
and the effectiveness of the criminal law will be undermined. 30 Packer
25.
26.

Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
Md.at 426 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438

27.

HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION 69 (1968).
Id. See also JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERvING 98 (1970). Feinberg argues

(1978)).

28.

that a theory of criminal law that ignores its function of moral condemnation will be "offensively
irrelevant."
29. PACKER, supra note 27, at 273. See also Coffee, supra note 21, at 245. "Stigma,"
Coffee contends, "is a scarce resource. Society does not have an unlimited capacity to express
condemnation or to feel revulsion." Id. Packer agrees: "The more indiscriminate we are in
treating conduct as criminal, the less stigma resides in the fact that a man has been convicted of
something called a crime." PACKER, supra note 27, at 273. See also Sanford H. Kadish, Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).

30. The presence of strict liability and "regulatory" offenses undermines this argument to
some extent, but the strict liability explosion is probably too recent to support any conclusions
about the results of "overcriminalization." Ultimately, the question is an empirical one. For a
sociological argument that the use of criminal law to punish behavior not traditionally regarded
as immoral does not reduce the moral force of the criminal law, see Harry V. Ball &Lawrence
M. Friedman, The Use of CriminalSanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A

CORPORATE CULPABILITY
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concedes that making culpability a necessary condition of punishment reduces
deterrence in the "narrow" or "crass" sense, but he believes that this loss is
outweighed by the accompanying gain of preserving the criminal law as "a
carrier of our shared morality." 3' Even if adherence to the principle of
responsibility were to yield a net loss in deterrent power, however, Packer and
other utilitarians argue that the principle should be retained to protect other
social goods, such as liberty, fairness and respect for individual autonomy.
H.L.A. Hart is perhaps the best-known proponent of this view. Hart acknowledges that observing the principle of responsibility costs the criminal law some
deterrent power.3 2 But, he argues, the benefits of the principle generally outweigh these costs. A system that routinely punished the non-culpable would
create an intolerably high level of anxiety and apprehension, -because citizens
could no longer rely on their own, voluntary efforts to avoid confrontations
with the criminal law.33 Such a system would reduce individual liberty by
,restricting citizens' power over the circumstances under which they become
subject to criminal sanctions, and by making it more difficult for them to plan
their future.34 In contrast, a society in which the principle of responsibility is
recognized
maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of [the]
law .... First, the individual has an option between obeying [the law] or

paying [the prescribed penalty]. The worse the laws are, the more

valuable the possibility of exercising this choice becomes in enabling an

individual to decide how he shall live. Secondly, this system not only
enables individuals to exercise this choice but increases the power of
individuals to identify beforehand periods wlhen the law's punishments
35
will not interfere with them and to plan their lives accordingly.

In addition, Hart argues, a system that recognizes the principle of responsibility
offer[s] individuals including the criminal the protection of the laws on

terms which are fair, because they not only consist of a framework of
reciprocal rights and duties, but because within this framework each
individual is given afairopportunity to choose between36keeping the law
required for society's protection or paying the penalty.

Packer echoes these arguments: "The prevention of crime is an essential
is,
if autonomy
is to flourish. It
required
environmental
aspect
of the
zeal,
pursued
with single-minded
a negative
aspect, protection
and one which,
however,
37
may end up creating an environment in which all are safe but none is free."

Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 206-07 (1965). For a more extended discussion of

the overcriminalization argument, see Coffee, supra note 21, at 242-46.
31. PACKER, supra note 27, at 65.
32. HART, supra note 18, at 19-20, 183. Both Hart and Packer point out that excuses
increase the likelihood of deception and place a heavier burden on the prosecution. They thus
lower the probability that the offender will be convicted and punished, thereby decreasing
"crass" deterrence. See PACKER, supra note 27, at 65.
33. HART, supra note 18, at 22-24, 181-82.
34. Id. at 181-82. For an extended discussion of this point in the context of the
organizational sentencing guidelines, see Coffee, supra note 21.
35. HART, supra note 18, at 23.
36.
37.

Id. at 22-23. See also id. at 181.
PACKER, supra note 27, at 65.
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As utilitarians, both Hart and Packer are prepared to override the principle of responsibility in cases in which adhering to it brings about counterutilitarian results. 38 If utility were understood solely in terms of crime
prevention, and the principle were shown to cause a net loss in deterrent
power, neither would hesitate to abandon the principle. Where utility is
understood broadly, however, in terms of a good society, Hart and Packer
believe that it will usually-although not always-be advanced by making
culpability a necessary condition of punishment.
B. Culpability at the Sentencing Stage
Unless the crime is a strict liability offense, culpability will enter the
sentencing decision automatically, simply through the fact that conviction
requires proof of a guilty mental state. It would be possible to determine the
offender's sentence without further consideration of culpability, on the basis of
purely forward-looking factors such as the possibility of rehabilitation or the
risk of recidivism. Indeed, for many years, this was the prevailing theory of
sentencing. 39 Recently, however, it it has been argued by a growing number of
theorists that judges should, and in fact do, hand down sentences that are
proportional to the degree of the offender's culpability. This principle has also
40
been incorporated into a number of model sentencing codes and guidelines.
Culpability is generally conceived of more broadly at sentencing than it
is at the trial stage.4 1 At trial, the question is simply whether the defendant had
the mental state required for conviction. The structure of a criminal trial
requires a "yes" or "no" answer to this question. The assessment of culpability at the sentencing stage, in contrast, is as much an inquiry into the
offender's character as it is a determination of his or her mental state at the
time of the crime. Factors such as the offender's past law enforcement record,
life history, remorse, or role as a "leader" or "follower" in the crime, are
commonly taken into account by sentencing judges. 42 These factors are often
inadmissible at trial, but they are considered relevant at sentencing because
they allow the judge to assess the character of the offender. Of course, a
sentencing judge may also take the opportunity to re-examine the mental state
of the defendant and "fine tune" the determination of mens rea made at trial.
A factor that failed to rise to the level of a defense to the crime; but which
38. Hart, for example, concludes that "[w]e must be prepared both to consider
exceptions to the principle [of responsibility] on their merits and to be careful that unnecessary
invasions of it are not made .
HART, supra note 18, at 183. See also PACKER, supra note
27, at 67.
39. From the late nineteenth century to the mid-1960s, sentencing theory was driven
primarily by a belief in the possibility of rehabilitating the criminal. The most important goals of
sentencing were rehabilitation and incapacitation. In the mid-1960s, this approach began to
receive criticism, and by the mid-1970s, it was widely attacked for its ineffectiveness and its
tendency to result in extremely disparate sentences for similar offenses. Andrew von Hirsch,
Recent Trends in American CriminalSentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6, 7-10 (1983).
40. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
41. As a matter of constitutional law, a judge framing a sentence is not limited to the
information received at trial, but is entitled to take into account a wide range of information about
the offender. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (holding sentencing judge
may take into account evidence of prior crimes inadmissible at trial); United States v. Grayson,
438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978) (holding sentencing judge may take into account judge's own belief that
defendant testified falsely at trial).
42.

See STANTON WHEELER E'I AL., SriING IN JUDGMENT 81 (1988).
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the offender's culpability, may become a mitigating
lessens the degree of
43
factor at sentencing.
Much of the recent emphasis on culpability can be attributed to the rise
of the "just deserts" school of sentencing theory."4 A version of retributivism,
this theory of punishment holds that the most important purpose of punishment
is to assign blame and to give the offender his "just deserts." For an offender
to be punished as he "deserves," punishment must be proportional to the factors that establish blameworthiness: the seriousness of the offense and the
degree of the offender's culpability. Other things being equal, a more culpable
offender should receive a harsher sentence, a less culpable offender a lighter
one. We may call this rule the "principle of proportionality."
It is not only retributivists who support the principle of proportionality,
however. Utilitarians such as Norval Morris and John Coffee view the principle as an important "side constraint" on the allocation of punishment accord45
ing to other criteria such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
Like Hart and Packer, who defend the principle of responsibility for utilitarian
rather than retributive reasons, these theorists believe the principle of proportionality advances such independent values as the principle of treating equals
46
equally or the need for a coherence between morality and the criminal law.
Finally, culpability is likely to be an important factor at sentencing even
for theorists who reject the principle of proportionality as such, because the
broad assessment of culpability made at the sentencing stage is relevant to the
goals of incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence. An offender who has
committed similar crimes in the past, who was a "leader" rather than a
"follower" in the criminal enterprise, or who is unrepentant at trial, has a
"worse character" and thus deserves more punishment than his or her less
culpable counterpart. But such an offender is also more likely to repeat the
crime, to be less ripe for rehabilitation, and to require a harsher punishment
before he or she is deterred. An inquiry into the offender's character-his or
her culpability, in the broad sense-is likely to prove helpful even where
desert is not a concern, and the sole goals of sentencing are rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and deterrence.
It is not surprising, then, that judges have weighed culpability heavily in
making sentencing decisions. In a recent study of the pre-Guidelines sentencing practices of federal judges with respect to white collar offenders, Wheeler,
et al., found that
43. See id at 93-97.
44. Andrew von Hirsch is perhaps the foremost representative of the just deserts theory.
See VON HIRSCH, supra note 14; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS INTHE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985). See also
JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE AND THERAPY (1979); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED
ON EQUITY AND DESERT (1979).
45. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Repressed Issues of Sentencing:Accountability, Predictability,and Equality in the Era of
the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.i. 975 (1978).
46. MORRIS, supranote 45, at 73-77. Coffee offers a Rawlsian argument in favor of the
principle of proportionality, arguing that rational, self-interested people behind a "veil of
ignorance" would choose to observe the principle of proportionality. Coffee, supra note 45, at
1080-99.
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in order for judges to arrive at what they feel is an appropriate sentence, they find it essential to locate defendants at least roughly in
terms of their blameworthiness. ... [Judges] may or may not use the
term blameworthy, but ... they describe offenders and the differences
between them in terms that enable an assessment of relative degrees
of blame, fault, or responsibility. Not a single judge claimed to be able
to sentence convicted offenders without regard to some such assessment. Indeed, characterizations of the offender along the dimension of
relative blameworthiness, culpability, or responsibility would appear to
loom at least as large in the judge's thinking as any of the other considerations in approaching sentencing. 47

Wheeler, et. al., found that judges employ a broad conception of culpability at
sentencing:
[T]he moral character of the person who committed the crime ... is
very much a part of the sentencing stage. Judges go'beyond the limited
moral texture of the contemporary substantive criminal law, expanding
their inquiry so that they evaluate many features of a case that touch
48
on a broad measure of moral blameworthiness.

Although the development of sentencing guidelines has restricted the
discretion of sentencing judges, it has not eliminated the importance of culpability. On the contrary, culpability has been given an express role in several
sets of sentencing guidelines. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for individual
offenders authorize both adjustments to an offender's "base penalty" and
departures from guideline sentences on the basis of factors relating to culpability. 49 The Model Penal Code allows a judge to place a defendant on pro-

bation if one or more of several culpability-related criteria is present.5 0 The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines also direct sentencing judges to consider
culpability.5 ' There is substantial disagreement among these guidelines as to
how broadly culpability should be conceived at sentencing. The Federal
Guidelines, for example, employ a much narrower conception of culpability
than do the Model Penal Code and some state guidelines. 52 Nevertheless, the
47. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 42, at 82.
48. Id. at 81, 87.
49. U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2, 3El.1, 4A, 5H1.8.
50. The Model Penal Code lists the following criteria as grounds on which to withhold a
prison sentence and place a defendant on probation:
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious harm;
(c) the defendant acted under strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's
criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (1962).
51. For example, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide for mitigation if the
offender "participated under circumstances of coercion or duress" or if the victim "was an
aggressor in the incident." MINNESOTA STATE GUIDELINES §§ lI.D.2d(l), (2).
52. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing judges are permitted to take
into consideration the offender's degree of involvement and prior law enforcement record. In
addition, judges may depart from the guideline sentence on the basis of excuses that do not
completely defeat mens rea, but still work to mitigate culpability. However, several
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culpability of the offender remains a significant factor in an age of guideline
sentencing.
C. Corporate Culpability
Culpability, then, plays an important role in the conviction and sentencing of individual criminals. But it is not yet clear that it should serve a function
in corporate criminal law. There are several reasons why one might believe
that corporate culpability is not an appropriate concern. Corporations are artificial entities, not biological persons, and thus may seem unsuitable objects of
moral blame and accompanying "stigma." Even if there is a sense in which
corporations can be "culpable," they are likely to have weaker claims to the
fair treatment, liberty, and reduction of anxiety emphasized by Hart than individuals do. Finally, the high number of strict liability offenses for which corporations can be liable suggests a lack of legislative concern with the issue of
corporate culpability. These arguments are ultimately unpersuasive, however.
I will argue that, although corporations cannot be blameworthy in the literal
sense in which individuals can, corporations cause and direct the acts of their
agents in a way that makes it natural to call them "culpable." Once this is
conceded, corporate culpability merits attention in the criminal law for the
same reasons that individual culpability does.
Although corporations always act through individual agents, and it is
always an individual agent or group of agents who breaks the law, it is fair to
say that corporations frequently cause their agents to violate the law. The
behavior of individuals in corporations is not merely the product of individual
choice; it is stimulated and shaped by goals, rules, policies, and procedures
that are features of the corporation as an entity. 53 How to design these features to ensure that agents act predictably and in the interest of the organization-that is, how to control the behavior of corporate agents-is the central
question of organizational theory. 54 Establishing a chain of command, delegating to each member a sphere of authority, setting up standard operating procedures, training membets, and controlling the flow of information are all part
of this task. 55 Ultimately, organizational theorist Herbert Simon explains, the
goal is for the organization to "takef] from the individual some of his decisional
56
autonomy, and substitute[] for it an organization decision-making process."
Where this process is likely to result in violations on behalf of the corporation
on the part of its agents, it seems natural to say that the corporation is
"culpable" or "at fault."
considerations that are relevant under other schemes, such as the provocation of the defendant
and the deliberateness of the crime, do not play a role.
53. See generally HENRY MINZBERG, THE STRUCrURING OF ORGANIZATIONS (1979);
HENRY TosI, THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION (1975). Ultimately, of course, some individual or
group of individuals may be responsible for these goals, rules, policies and procedures. But this
is not always the case. The rules may have sprung up without conscious planning in the course
of daily activity, and have taken on a life of their own. Or they may be of such long standing that
it is no longer possible to identify their creators.
54. This is true even for organizational theorists who prefer terms like "cooperation" to
"control." The problem is essentially the same: getting individuals to act in ways that 1) are
predictable and 2) benefit the corporation and conform to its aims. See generally TOSI, supra
note 53; MINTZBERG, supra note 53.
55. See MINTZBERG, supra note 53, at 181-213.
56.

HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 8 (3d ed. 1976).
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It is important to distinguish this argument from the claim that it is
sometimes difficult to locate the specific corporate agents responsible for a
criminal act. Although this claim is true, it is an evidentiary point rather than a
philosophical one. My argument is somewhat different: Because of the diffusion of responsibility in organizations and the ways in which individual decisions are channelled by corporate rules, policies and structures, there may in
fact be no individual or group of individuals that is "justly to blame" for the
crime.5 7 Individuals in corporations frequently operate in a kind of "twilight
zone" of autonomy; they may simply exert insufficient choice or control to be
suitable recipients of blame. In this situation, the "overflow" blame is properly
attributed to the corporation.
Scholars of corporate crime recognize that characteristics of the corporation can cause criminal behavior on the part of its agents. Martin and
Carolyn Needleman, for example, argue that "at least some criminal behavior
usefully may be viewed not as personal deviance, but rather as a predictable
product of the individual's membership in or contact with certain organizational systems."5 8 5Many
theorists have identified a corporate character or
"corporate culture" 9 which endures over time and transcends the character
of the corporation's members. Christopher Stone has found that corporations,
like political administrations, have distinct and characteristic attitudes toward
the demands of law and morality. 60 "In [the corporate] setting," Stone writes,
"each man's own wants, ideas-even his perceptions and emotions-are
swayed and directed by an institutional structure so pervasive that it might be

construed as having a set of goals and constraints (if not a mind and purpose)
of its own." 6' Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager argue:

57. Of course, the evidentiary and the philosophical points are related. If there are no
individuals who may be justly held to blame for corporate crime, it is not surprising that it is
difficult to "locate" these individuals.
58. Martin Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, OrganizationalCrime: Two Models of
Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517 (1979). See also MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C.
YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 58-60, 63-67 (1980) (cultural norms of the corporation can
encourage criminal behavior); Laura S. Schrager & James R. Short, Jr., Toward a Sociology of
OrganizationalCrime, 25 SOC. PROBS. 407, 410 (1978) (criminal behavior is caused more by
roles assigned to members of the corporation than by personalities of the members); Note,
IncreasingCommunity Control over CorporateCrime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71
YALE L.J. 280, 282 (1961) (goal of criminal acts by members of corporations is frequently
enrichment of the corporation rather than of individuals).
59. See, e.g., TERENCE E. DEAL & ALLEN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES
(1982); THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE
(1982); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS, 228-48 (1975). Although the
corporate culture is strongly influenced by top management, it is independent of it. Clinard and
Yeager argue that corporate executives "are subject ... to the same kinds of indoctrination into
the corprate mind as are employees at lower levels." CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 66.
60. STONE, supra note 59, at 237. Stone discusses a study finding that coal mines
owned by steel firms have significantly better worker safety records than coal mines owned by
coal mining companies. One of the most commonly given explanations for the discrepancy, he
reports, is simply a difference in attitude between steel companies and coal companies: "[t]he
steel companies have just not evolved what was called 'a "coal mentality"' that accepts a great
loss of life and limb as the price of digging coal." Id. at 238 (citing Coal-Mines Study Shows
Record Can Be Improved When Firms Really Try, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 1973, at p. 1, col.
6).
61.
STONE, supra note 59, at 7.
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When certain corporations are charged more than once with violations, it is possible, of course, that enforcement agencies, alerted to the
possibility of repeat violations, have policed these particular firms more
closely and thereby increased the odds that subsequent violations will
be discovered. It is more likely, however, that some corporations ...
have developed a corporate atmosphere favorable to unethical and illegal behavior and that executives and other employees of these corporations may have become socialized to violate the law. 62

There appear to be "kood" and "bad" corporations, law-abiding corporations
and recidivists, and there is a remarkable consensus as to which corporations

are which. 63 The ability of theorists to identify corporate characters is evidence that it is not inappropriate to speak of corporate culpability.
The idea of corporate culpability is not merely a product of organizational theory and research on corporate crime; it is part of ordinary moral discourse. People behave in ways that suggest they blame corporations and feel
retributive sentiments toward them. 64 They frequently voice moral judgments
about corporations, such as "Union Carbide is indifferent to safety" or "JohnsManville took advantage of its employees." Such statements may be merely
shorthand ways of blaming corporate executives whose identities are
unknown to the speaker. But they can also be read as judgments passed on

the character or policies of the corporation. This interpretation is strengthened
when the judgments apply to the corporation over a substantial period of time,
or are accompanied by acts directed at the corporation as an entity, such as
picketing or boycotts. Moreover, there is evidence that the stigma of moral
blameworthiness that accompanies these judgments is capable of seriously
injuring not merely individuals, but the corporation as a whole. 65 The effect of

62. CLINARD & YEAGER, supranote 58, at p. 117.
63. See, e.g., MARSHALL CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION 17-18 (1990) (listing
companies which "demonstrat[e] a high degree of social responsibility and compliance with the
law"); TAD F. TULEJA, BEYOND THE BOTTOM LINE 193-98 (1985) (comparing results of
different studies of "socially responsible" Fortune 500 companies). The consensus is not merely
among scholars of corporate crime, but exists in the popular media as well. Id. Certain
companies, such as Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble, Digital Equipment, 3M, and
Hershey Foods are mentioned again and again as having "good" characters. Id.; CLINARD,
supra, at 17-18. Conversely, certain companies are said to have "bad" characters: Clinard writes
that "[a]Ithough its advertising motto is 'GE Brings Good Things to Life,' General Electric
actually has a long history of unethical and illegal practices, according to an in-depth study done
by John Woodmansee." CLINARD, supra, at 16 (citing JOHN WOODMANSEE, THE WORLD OF
THE GIANT CORPORATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE GE PROJECT (1975)).
64. See Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus
Individual Wrongdoing, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 163 (1989). That people blame
corporations should not be surprising. They blame other groups and organizations as well,
including governments, nations, and races.
65. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACr OF PUBLICITY ON
CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983) (a study of the impact of adverse publicity on 17 corporate
offenders); CLINARD, supra note 63, at 177-78. A recent example of the impact of stigma on a
corporation is that of Salomon Brothers, which lost several of its largest customers after the fium
was found to have engaged in illegal bidding in Federal Treasury auctions. The California
pension fund known as "Calpers" and other major clients withdrew their business from Salomon
when the scandal broke, expressing "outrage and concern" at Salomon's illegal activities.
Salomon responded by attempting to reform the "character" of the corporation, replacing top
management and introducing "new policies and [control] procedures." Stan Hinden, Salomon
Loses Major Bond Customer, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1991, at Fl. F2. Calpers and other
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such stigma is so strong that several commentators have suggested the use of
court-ordered adverse publicity as a criminal sanction against corporate
offenders.6
Once it is conceded that corporations can be culpable, retribution and
rehabilitation join deterrence and incapacitation as potential aims of corporate
criminal law. The extent to which corporate culpability plays a role will
depend upon which of these aims are pursued, and the relative importance of
each aim. If retribution were adopted as a goal, corporate culpability would
assume a central role in the allocation of punishment; it would be necessary to
inquire whether the corporation was culpable (at the trial stage) and, if so,
how culpable (at sentencing), in order to determine the corporation's "just
deserts." Retribution has not been a traditional aim of corporate criminal law,
but once the sense in which corporations are culpable has been more clearly
identified, there is no reason why it should not become one. The public
response to corporate violations noted above suggests that the idea of giving
corporate offenders their "just deserts" is not entirely farfetched. 67 Indeed, the
need to provide "just punishment," a requirement of § 3553(a)(2)(A) of the
Sentencing Reform Act,68 was one of the controlling principles in the drafting
of the organizational guidelines, 69 and Congress appears to equate
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) with the "just deserts" principle. 70
Corporate culpability will also play a role if a choice is made to rehabilitate corporate offenders. In order to decide whether to rehabilitate, and, if so,
what kind of rehabilitation is appropriate, a sentencing judge would need to
inquire carefully into the corporate character-that is, to make precisely the
kind of broad-based culpability assessment that is made in the sentencing of
individuals. Like retribution, rehabilitation has not been a traditional goal of
corporate criminal law. But the fact that corporations have distinctive characters that may cause their agents to commit crimes on their behalf suggests
that rehabilitation is a worthwhile goal. In the past few years, the idea of
customers have since begun to do business with Salomon again. A Salomon Client Is Back,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at D9.
66. Adverse publicity was proposed as an organizational sanction in UNITED STATES
NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFr OF A NEW

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 405(l)(a) (1970). See also FiSSE & BRAITHWATE, supra note
65; CLINARD, supra note 63, at 179-80; Peter A. French, Publicity and the Control of
Corporate Conduct: Hester Prynne's New Image, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS AND
UNRULY LAW 159 (Brent Fisse & Peter A. French eds., 1985). But see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
"No Soul To Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
CorporatePunishment,79 MICH. L. REv. 386,424-34 (1981) (pointing out several difficulties
with the use of publicity as a sanction, and suggesting that the sanction would be more effective
if directed to individual agents rather than to the corporation as a whole).
67. Theorists who argue in favor of retribution as an aim of corporate criminal law
include KIP SCULEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1991) and Brent Fisse,
Reconstructing CorporateCriminal Law: Deterrence,Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) provides that, "in determining the particular sentence to
be imposed, [a court] shall consider ... the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense."
69. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 7, at 5.
70. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 75 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3258. (§ 3553(a)(2)(A) represents "essentially the 'just deserts'
concept.").
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organizational sanctions designed to rehabilitate the corporation, such as
"corporate probation," have received increasingly strong support.7' The
organizational guidelines include creative and broad-reaching provisions for
has explicitly endorsed
corporate probation, 72 and the Sentencing Commission
73
the goal of rehabilitating corporate offenders.
Corporate culpability may also be important for reasons independent of
the purposes of sentencing. As noted above, recognition of the principles of
responsibility and proportionality helps protect such social values as liberty,
equality, and fair treatment. As legal fictions, corporations have weaker claims.
to participation in these values than do individuals. Nevertheless, they do have
some claim. Corporations are associations of individuals, and as such, are
repositories of individual interests. These interests are entitled to protection,
and it may turn out that the only way, the most effective way, or simply the
most convenient way to protect them is to protect the interests of the corporation as an entity. This may be why, even though they are merely fictional
persons, corporations have limited constitutional rights to free speech, due
process, equal protection, and protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 74 The fact that corporations have weaker claims to rights than
individuals means that, in a utilitarian scheme, corporate rights can be overridden more easily than individual rights. We need less powerful reasons to
ignore the principles of responsibility and proportionality with respect to corporate offenders than we do with respect to individuals. This does not mean that
corporate culpability is an inappropriate concern for the organizational sentencing guidelines, however. It simply suggests that it is not the only factor
that comes into play in deciding whether, and if so, how much, to punish a
corporate criminal.

II.

CONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE CULPABILITY
Part I has argued that there is a sense in which corporations can be
culpable, and that culpability is thus a legitimate concern of the organizational
sentencing guidelines. But it is not yet clear how corporate culpability is best
conceptualized. Part II examines three theories of corporate culpability in an
attempt to determine how the concept should be understood.
71. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 59; Coffee, supra note 66; Fisse, supra note 67;
Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization:SanctioningCorporateOffenders
Through CorporateProbation,16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988).
72. U.S.S.G. § 8D. See generally Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation
Under the New OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L. 2017 (1992).
73.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.

74. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal [id]entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such
body."). Of course, even if the corporation is a repository of individual interests, adherence to
the principles of responsiblity and proportionality is not necessarily the only way, or the best
way, to protect these interests. To determine whether it is requires an examination of the
relationship between the corporation and these groups of individuals, a task beyond the scope of
this Article. Consider shareholders and customers, for example. Several commentators have
argued that in fact any sanctions against the corporation are passed on to "innocent" parties such
as shareholders and customers. It is not clear that punishing the corporation only when it is
"culpable," and only in proportion to the degree of its culpability, protects these interests in a
meaningful sense.
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Although the law has produced no independent doctrine of corporate
culpability, courts have had to develop conceptions of corporate mens rea in
order to hold corporations liable for crimes requiring intent. The two prevailing
doctrines of corporate criminal liability-the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine found in section 2.07 of the Model Penal
Code-thus provide a natural starting point for a theory of corporate culpability. In addition, there is a third, competing theory of corporate criminal liability
that has received considerable academic support. This theory, which will be
referred to as the "corporate character" theory, has its closest legal analogue
in the doctrine of municipality liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I will argue that
the "corporate character" theory contains a more satisfactory concept of corporate culpability than either the doctrine of respondeat superior or the Model
Penal Code. Moreover, the theory contains a notion of corporate culpability
ihat is particularly appropriate at the sentencing stage. In Part III, I will argue
that it is this concept of corporate culpability that most closely approximates
the one employed by the organizational sentencing guidelines.
A. Respondeat Superior
Although corporations were held liable for strict liability crimes in the
United States as early as 1834, 75 it was not until the early 1900s that they
began to be convicted for crimes requiring mens rea.76 The early view was
that because corporations have no mind or soul, they are incapable of having
an "evil intent." In order to circumvent this objection, the courts borrowed the
doctrine of respondeat superior from the law of tort,7 7 and "imputed" to the
corporation both the act and the intent of the corporate agent who committed
the crime. The result was that the corporation was "culpable" precisely when,
and to the extent that, its agent was culpable. The United States Supreme
Court expressly endorsed this approach in the 1909 case New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad v. United States.78 Under New York Central, a corporation is liable for a criminal act if: 1) an agent of the corporation committed
the crime; 2) the agent acted within the scope of his or her employment; and
3) the agent acted to benefit the corporation. 79 The formulation of New York
Central is the doctrine of corporate criminal liability used today in the federal
courts and in some state jurisdictions.
75. Initially, corporations were held liable for acts of nonfeasance and misfeasance
causing a public nuisance.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 1 Alaska 217, 220 (1901) ("If, for
example, the invisible, intangible essence of air which we term a corporation can level
mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can also intend
to do these acts, and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously."); United States v. John
Kelso Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898).
77. See generally WILLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at
460-70 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
78. 212 U.S. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
79. Id at 493. The Supreme Court limited its holding to crimes which required general
intent to perform the prohibited act, and seemed to exclude crimes that require specific intent. It
acknowledged that "there are some crimes which in their nature cannot be committed by
corporations." Id. at 494. Since that time, however, corporations have been held liable for
crimes requiring specific intent, including contempt of court, conspiracy to violate antitrust laws,
knowingly mailing obscene materials, and manslaughter. Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate
CriminalAccountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393. 415
(1982).
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As its history suggests, the doctrine of imputed mens rea was the creation of expediency rather than careful reflection. 80 Early decisions on corporate criminal liability tend to emphasize not the plausibility of the idea of
corporate culpability, but the dire consequences of failure to extend criminal
liability to corporations. The comments of Judge Hough in United States v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Co.81 are typical: "The same law that creates the
corporation may create the crime, and to assert that the Legislature cannot
punish its own creature because it cannot make a creature capable of violatbear discussion." 82 The Supreme Court's reasoning in
ing the law does not ...
New York Central also emphasizes public policy rather than conceptual
analysis.8 3 It is not surprising, then, that the theory of imputed culpability has
encountered serious theoretical problems.
1. Problems of Overinclusiveness
The first troubling feature of the theory of imputed culpability is that it
imputes to the corporation only the mens rea of the agent who committed the
crime, and ignores the mental states of other corporate agents. But if corporations have "characters," as argued above, and if corporate policies and procedures can cause crime, the culpability of the corporate entity is likely to
depend on more than the intent of a single agent.84 By imputing only the mens
rea of the criminal, the imputed culpability theory fails to distinguish between
offenses committed with the participation or encouragement of upper
management, pursuant to corporate policies or procedures, and those committed by "rogue employees" whose acts violated company policy or could not
have been prevented by careful supervision. For this reason, the theory has
seemed to many commentators to be unfairly overinclusive.8 5 It labels corporations "culpable" even when they do not have a "bad" character, that is,
even where corporate policies and procedures bear no causal relationship to
the crime.

80. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation,19 U. PriT. L. REV. 21
(1957). Mueller characterizes corporate criminal liability as a "weed" on the acre of criminal
jurisprudence: "[Tihe rationale of corporate criminal liability is all but clear. It is safe to say that,
It simply rests on an
for the most part, the law has proceeded without rationale whatsoever ....
assumption that such liability is a necessary and useful thing." Id. at 23.
81. 149 F. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
82. Id at 836.
83. See 212 U.S. at 495. The Court stated:
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents
and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent
and whose knowledge
of its agents to whom it has intrusted authority to act ...
and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for which the agents act.
Id.

84. This may not always be true. As will become clear below, there may be some agents
who are so closely identified with the corporation that their culpable acts make the corporation
culpable. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 67, at 79; Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A
Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1103-05
(1991); Developments in the Law: CorporateCrime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through
Criminal Sanctions,92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1979) [hereinafter Developments in the
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One way to resolve the problem of overinclusiveness would be to read
the "scope of employment" requirement narrowly, so as to exclude acts that
are not authorized, encouraged, or negligently permitted by corporate policy.
The "scope of employment" requirement has been used this way in tort law to
distinguish between conduct that is controlled or authorized by the principal
and conduct that is not.8 6 In the criminal context, however, courts and commentators seem to fear that this approach would allow corporations to defeat
liability too easily. For example, corporate officials might tolerate illegal behavior on an informal basis, yet place the behavior outside the "scope of employment" by declaring a formal corporate "policy" against it.87 This result could
be avoided by a well-crafted definition of corporate policy.88 However, courts
have not attempted to frame such a definition, and have chosen instead to hold
corporations criminally liable for the acts of their employees even when those
acts contravened corporate policy or violated the express orders of a corporate official. As presently interpreted, the "scope of employment" requirement
thus provides no protection against overinclusiveness.
In United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,8 9 for example, the hotel was held
liable for its purchasing agent's participation in a boycott even though the
agent twice received express instructions not to take part in the boycott, and
violated those instructions out of "anger and personal pique." 90 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed that "within the scope of employment" meant "in the corporation's behalf in performance of the agent's general line of work," and that a
corporation was "responsible for acts and statements of its agents, done or
made within the scope of their employment, even though their conduct may be
contrary to their actual instructions or contrary to the corporation's stated
policies."91 Subsequent cases have followed the Hilton Hotels holding. 92
A second strategy to combat overinclusiveness would be to read the
benefit requirement narrowly, holding that an employee acts "for the benefit of
the corporation" only where the act is authorized, tolerated, or encouraged by
corporate policy. At least one case suggests sympathy for this approach,
affirming instructions which allowed jurors to consider corporate policy and
actual directions from superiors in determining whether an employee acted to
benefit the corporation. 93 However, this case made consideration of policy
86. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228. Principals often attempt to show
that the negligent act was committed while the employee was on a "frolic and detour," for
example. PROSSER, supra note 78, at § 70. There is no comparable "frolic and detour"
litigation in corporate criminal law.
87. See, e.g., Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945).
88. In Parts II.C.I., 2., infra, I discuss some ways in which organizational policy might
be defined so as to serve as a factor in a theory of organizational culpability. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-30, 148-56.
89. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
90. Id at 1004.
91.

Id.

92. See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971).
93. Basic Constr., 711 F.2d at 570. In this case, the Fourth Circuit upheld jury
instructions stating: "A corporation may be responsible for the action of its agents done or made
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permissible, not mandatory. And in the absence of a clear definition of corporate policy, this approach has the same defect as a narrow reading of the
scope of employment requirement: it allows corporations to defeat liability for
the criminal acts of employees simply by declaring crimes to be against company policy.
Even without the proposed narrowing, the benefit requirement would
help guard against overinclusiveness if it were read to require a showing that
the crime would actually have benefited the corporation if it had been
successful. The fact that an action benefits a corporation makes it more likely
that the act was encouraged, authorized or tolerated by corporate policy.
However, actual benefit is not a completely reliable surrogate for corporate
policy. There are cases in which corporate policies and procedures seem -to
have encouraged violations even without a discemable direct benefit to the
corporation. For this reason, courts generally hold a corporation liable for the
criminal acts of its employees even where it has received no benefit, except
where it is clear that the act is committed exclusively for the benefit of the
employee 94 or where it actively harms the corporation. 95
Ultimately, the respondeat superior theory is overinclusive because it is
a theory of imputed culpability. Under a theory of imputed culpability, what
makes a corporation "culpable" is not (primarily) any feature of the corporation as such, but the mere fact that an agent committed a crime. Thus the theory will frequently label a corporation culpable even when the corporation
does not have a bad character-that is, even when the corporation's policies
or procedures suggest that it is not "justly to blame" for the crime. In short,
the respondeat superior theory is overinclusive because it is not a theory of
corporate culpability at all. The problem of overinclusiveness could be corrected if imputation of guilt to the corporation were made to depend on some
feature of the corporate entity. The refinements of the "scope of employment"
and "benefit" requirements suggested above attempt to do precisely this. But
corporate criminal law has not proved hospitable to such developments.
In practice, the theory of respondeat superior may pose little genuine
threat of overinclusiveness. There is some evidence that prosecutors examine
features of the corporation before deciding to seek criminal sanctions, and
pursue primarily corporations with "bad characters," whose policies or policymakers can be causally linked with the crimes of their agents.96 Such prosecutorial restraint is evidence of the intuitive appeal of a theory of corporate
entity culpability. Nevertheless, prosecutorial self-restraint does not provide
the inherent or legal protection against the problem of overinclusiveness that a
genuine theory of corporate culpability would provide.

within the scope of their authority, even though the conduct of the agents may be contrary to the
corporation's actual instructions, or contrary to the corporation's stated position. However, the
existence of such instructions and policies ... may be considered by you in determining whether
the agents, in fact, were acting to benefit the corporation." Id. at 572.
94. See.United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
95. See Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
96. See, e.g., Testimony of Gary Lynch, Public Hearings on the July, 1988 Discussion
Draft, October 11, 1988 (on file with author); CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 93.
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2. Problems of Underinclusiveness
The problem discussed above was one of overinclusiveness: the theory
of imputed culpability used in the doctrine of respondeat superior treats corporations as culpable even when no feature of the corporate entity caused the
crime. But the theory is potentially underinclusive, as well. There are some
situations in which corporate policies or procedures do cause a crime, yet the
doctrine of respondeat superior is unable to find the corporation culpable
because there is no individual culpability to impute. As a practical matter, this
difficulty has been resolved by the introduction of new doctrines of corporate
mens rea that have been superimposed upon the respondeat superior theory.
But these doctrines represent a significant departure from, rather than a
development of, the rationale underlying respondeat superior. The fact that the
doctrine must be gerrymandered in order to prevent underinclusiveness suggests that it is an inadequate theory of corporate culpability.
An illustration of the problem of underinclusiveness is the handing down
of inconsistent verdicts in cases in which a corporation and its agents are tried
together in front of the same jury. Because it works by imputing to the corporation the act and intent of the agent who committed the crime, the doctrine of
respondeat superior requires that the verdicts be identical: If the agent is
found guilty, the corporation must be found guilty; if the agent is found not
guilty, the corporation must be found not guilty as well. But juries often render
inconsistent verdicts, acquitting corporate agents but holding the corporation
liable, or vice-versa. Most courts have rejected such results as inconsistent
with the doctrine of respondeat superior. 97 But some have upheld inconsistent
verdicts.98 In American Medical Association v. United States,99 for example,
the court upheld a guilty verdict against an association for antitrust violations
even though the individuals indicted were acquitted. The court reasoned that
"[w]hen a corporation is guilty of crime it is because of a corporate act, a
corporate intent .... The fact that a corporation can act only by human agents

is immaterial." 0 0 The fact that juries hand down, and courts uphold, such
inconsistent verdicts suggests that many people believe that the culpability of a
corporation is not coextensive with the culpability of a corporate agent. 10 1
Upholding inconsistent verdicts represents one way to avoid the

97. See, e.g., Imperial Meat Co. v. United States, 316 F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 370--71
(8th Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376,411 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 613
(1941).
99. 130F.2dat233.
100. Id. at 253.
101. Of course, it may just suggest jury irrationality. Juries hand down inconsistent
verdicts in other situations, as well. The general rule has been to tolerate inconsistent verdicts on
the ground that they may give voice to the "rough common sense of the community." If this is
so, it suggests that the community believes that corporate guilt is not the same as individual guilt.
Or, in cases in which the corporation is convicted and the individual is acquitted, it may simply
be that there is less "regret" about convicting a corporation. See Stephen T. Wax, Inconsistent
and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 713 (1979); Comment,
Inconsistent Verdicts in a FederalCriminal Trial,60 COLUM. L. REv. 999, 1002-04 (1960).
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underinclusiveness that would result if the doctrine of respondeat superior
were followed.
A second way in which courts have coped with the problem of underinclusiveness is the development of the "collective knowledge" doctrine. This
doctrine enables courts to find liability in cases in which the corporation seems
"justly to blame" for the crime, but no single individual has the required mens
rea. It permits a finding of corporate mens rea to be derived from the collective knowledge of the corporation's members. In United States v. Bank of
New England, N.A.,102 for example, the bank was found guilty of "willfully"
violating the Currency Transaction Reporting Act even though no one of its
agents was found to have had the required "willfulness." The First Circuit
upheld a collective knowledge instruction to the jury:
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the
context of corporate criminal liability .... Corporations compartmental-

ize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and opera-

tions into smaller components. The aggregate of these components

constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is
irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an
operation know the specific activities of employees administering
10 3
another aspect of the operation.

The fact that some employees were aware of the Act's reporting requirements, while other employees were aware of the transactions, was enough to
constitute willfulness on the part of the Bank. A similar approach was taken in
United States v. T.LM.E.-D.C104 In that case, the company adopted a policy
under which truck drivers who called in sick were marked absent unexcused;
if a driver later verified his illness, the unexcused absence was stricken from
his record. The court combined knowledge on the part of some employees
that a particular truck driver was sick, with knowledge on the part of other
employees that drivers generally were concerned about and confused by the
policy, and held the company liable for knowingly permitting a driver to
operate a motor vehicle while his alertness was impaired:
[A] corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its full import. Rather, the
corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of
its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accord-

ingly.105
Although it is often presented as a simple extension of respondeat superior liability, the doctrine of collective knowledge represents a marked departure from the theory of imputed culpability articulated in New York Central.
Under the theory of imputed culpability, a corporation is culpable if and only if
an individual is culpable. Strictly speaking, if no individual has the requisite
mens rea, no "cTime" has been committed by a corporate employee, and thus
102. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
103. Id.at 856.
104. 381 F. Supp. 730, 738-39 (W.D. Va. 1974). See also Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 330 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1963); Riss & Company v. United States, 262 F.2d

245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958); Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir.
1951); United States v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Minn. 1971).
105. T.LM.E.-D.C., 381 F. Supp. at 738.
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no crime can be imputed. Under the doctrine of collective knowledge, in contrast, no individual culpability is required. Fragments of knowledge that do not
rise to the level of mens rea may be aggregated to form a sufficient whole.
This approach only makes sense if employees are viewed as aspects of a corporate entity which is distinct from each of them, and the crime is understood
not as the act of an individual, but as the act of the corporate entity as such.
The doctrine thus represents a step away from the concept of imputed culpability and toward a theory of genuine corporate fault.
As a practical matter, the toleration of inconsistent verdicts and the
development of the doctrine of collective knowledge largely resolve the problem of underinclusiveness posed by the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
fact that it was necessary to gerrymander the theory in order to achieve this
goal, however, highlights the theory's weaknesses. A more effective and
principled approach would be to develop a genuine theory of corporate entity
culpability. Such a theory would not only alleviate the problem of underinclusiveness without resort to a legal fiction; it would also provide a check against
overinclusiveness in addition to the present one of prosecutorial self-restraint.
B. The Model PenalCode

The second principal theory of corporate criminal liability is found in
section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code. Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, section 2.07 was adopted after sustained theoretical reflection. 106 The
drafters of the Code appear to have believed that a corporation should not be
judged culpable for the mere act of a "rogue employee," and attempted to
correct the overinclusiveness of the doctrine of respondeat superior by providing a genuine theory of corporate entity culpablity. 107 Most commentators, 108
however, believe that the Code errs on the side of underinclusiveness, and
that although section 2.07 captures part of what is meant by corporate
culpability, it is ultimately too narrow.
The Model Penal Code's scheme is threefold, depending on the kind of
offense involved: 1) For offenses defined in statutes other than the Code itself,
in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations "plainly
appears,"' 109 section 2.07(a) adopts a version of the common law theory of
respondeat superior: corporations are liable for offenses committed by agents
106. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal
Code, 19 RUTGERS LJ.593, 595-96 (1988); Mueller, supra note 80.
107. The drafters intended the approach of the Code to be consistent with § 909 of the
Restatement of Torts, which restricts the circumstances under which a principal is liable for
punitive damages for the act of an agent to those in which the principal is personally at fault.
Comment b to § 909 states: "The rule stated in this Section results from the reasons for
awarding punitive damages, which make it improper ordinarily to award punitive damages
against one who himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only vicariously."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909, cmt. b (1977). However, if the principal orders,
ratifies, or expresses approval of the agent's action, or has recklessly employed an agent known
to be inclined to act tortiously, § 909 states that punitive damages are appropriate. 1 KATHLEEN
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 3.03, at 96 (1992).
108. See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 106; Developments in the Law, supra note 85, at
1255.
109. An example would be the Elkins Act, under which the Railroad was held liable in
New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States in 1909. See supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text.
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acting on behalf of the corporation within the scope of their employment. 110
The Code departs from common law, however, by providing a defense if the
corporation can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "the high
managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of
the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.""' 2) For strict
liability crimes and offenses that consist of an omission to discharge a specific
statutory duty, the principles of respondeat superior also apply, but no due
diligence defense is available. 112 3) For all other offenses, the Code holds
corporations liable only if the offense was "authorized, requested, commanded,
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting3 in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment.""
Much of the impact of the Code depends on when a legislative purpose
to impose liability on corporations can be said to "plainly appear." The answer
to this question determines whether most crimes fall into category one or category three above. On its face, the Code's language suggests a presumption
that criminal statutes do not apply to corporations, and thus that the drafters
intended most crimes to fall into the third category. Even if this were not so,
however, it is fair to say that the most significant feature of the Code is the
emphasis it places on the behavior of "high managerial officials" in the corporation.
Although it focuses on the behavior of corporate agents, the theory of
culpability underlying the Model Penal Code is not, strictly speaking, one of
"imputed culpability." With the exception of crimes of nonfeasance, 114 the
Code does not simply impute to the corporation the mens rea of the agent who
committed the crime; it requires a corporatemens rea, a causal link between
the crime and the corporate entity. This link is assumed to lie in the acts, or
failures to act, of "high managerial officials." Such officials are important, not
because their behavior is imputed to the corporation, but because their place
in the company puts them in a position to stand for its policies, intentions, or
character. The Code defines high managerial officials as agents "having duties
of such responsibility that [their] conduct may fairly be assumed to represent
the policy of the corporation."" 5 Under section 2.07, Gerhard Mueller
explains, upper-level managers are thought of as the "mind" of the corporation, lower-level employees as its "hands." The Code's scheme reduces the
number of instances in which corporations are held liable for mere movements
of the hand without an "order from the brain."" 6
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (1962). This standard also applies to
"violations," that is, "minor offenses that are not classified as crimes." Id. at cmt. 2(a). In short,
respondeat superior liability is only intended to apply to regulatory offenses, rather than "true"
crimes like murder, manslaughter, and so forth; even in these cases, a due diligence defense is
provided.
111. Id. § 2.07(5). The defense is not available for strict liability offenses, or if the
defense would be "plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular
offense." Id
112. Id. § 2.07(l)(b), 2.07(2), 2.07(5).
113. Id. § 2.07(I)(c).
114. And, of course, strict liability crimes. But these are never crimes of imputed intent,
because intent is irrelevant for these crimes.
115.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c).

116.

Mueller, supra note 80, at 41.
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The Code's association of corporate policy with the behavior of high
managerial officials is generally consistent with the observations of organizational theorists. Delegation of authority to such officials is one of the primary
ways in which organizations direct and control the behavior of their agents.
Some officials are so closely identified with the organization that their participation in or toleration of criminal activities sends a message that such activities are consistent with corporate policy.11 7 According to scholars of corporate
crime, the behavior of high managerial officials is perhaps the most important
factor in determining the likelihood that a corporation will engage in crime. 118
Moreover, by insisting on a form of corporate entity culpability as a condition
of liability for most crimes, the Code avoids the overinclusiveness of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Under the Code, it is unlikely that a corporation will be found culpable if it has a "good character" and no causal link
with the crime. In the Hilton Hotels case noted above, for example, the corporation would probably not be liable under section 2.07(1)(a) or (1)(c) for its
purchasing agent's violation of antitrust law, because the crime violated the
express orders of a "high managerial employee."11 9
In its attempt to avoid overinclusiveness, however, the Model Penal
Code adopts too narrow a theory of corporate culpability. Although "high
managerial officials" are the employees most closely identified with the corporation, they are not the only shapers of corporate policy and character. Rules,
goals, and standard operating procedures implemented by lower-level managers can also create an unethical "corporate character" and encourage violations of the law:
The facts of modem corporate life discredit the notion that a pattern of
wrongdoing cannot reflect corporate policy unless a corporate official
who sets general business policy authorized or ratified the conduct. In
today's corporate environment, "corporate policy" is a multifaceted
concept. Because responsibility is so diffused, policy is made and implemented at various levels in the corporate hierarchy without first
seeking approval from the highest levels of management. ... Thus,
although the model of corporate liability that relies upon the acquiescence of the Board of Directors or a high managerial agent may be
workable in the context of small, closely-held corporations, to the
extent that we are concerned about holding large organizations

117.

Some theorists argue that even a high managerial official can be a "rogue employee."

See PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE REsPONSIBLITY (1984). But this position
ignores the role of the official's authority and position in controlling the activities of other

corporate agents. The higher an official is in the corporate hierarchy, the more likely it is that his

order will be followed and the less likely it is that it will be countermanded by another official.
To be sure, some officials may have more de facto authority than others, and the inquiry into
how much authority they have is a fact-dependent one.
118. See MARSHALL CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME 132 (1983)
(identifying the behavior of upper management as the most important factor in the development
of an unethical corporate culture). :
119. Of course, the company would be liable if the purchasing agent counted as a "high
managerial employee." However, comments to the Code suggest that he or she would not count
as such. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, cmt. 2(c) (1962). In general, corporations are
unlikely to be liable under the Code for crimes committed by low-level employees against the

orders of upper management, because such orders are likely to constitute a due diligence
defense.
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accountable for serious misconduct, this model of liability is self-defeating.120

In some cases, there may be no clear authorization or participation by a high
managerial official, yet an illegal practice may be so pervasive that it amounts
to a way of doing business. Such conduct cannot easily be dismissed as the
initative of a few "rogue employees." The corporation as an entity seems at
fault, and an assessment of culpability should not depend upon proof of the
involvement of a high managerial official. In addition, critics charge that corporations can easily evade liability under the Model Penal Code by delegating to
subordinates acts that might result in criminal liability and by avoiding knowledge of such acts. Although the Code attempts to provide a theory of corporate entity liability, then, its conception of corporate fault is inadequate.
Significantly, of the approximately twenty-five states that have adopted some
version of the Model Penal Code, almost none retain the scheme in its pure
form, and all the states that have altered it have enacted theories of corporate
culpability broader than that employed by the Code. 2 1
C. The Corporate Character Theory
Neither of the theories of corporate culpability currently employed at the
trial stage, then, is completely satisfactory. The respondeat superior theory
assigns culpability to the corporation even when the agent's crime was the
work of a "rogue employee," with no link to corporate character or policy.
Moreover, without substantial gerrymandering, the theory is unable to find
corporations culpable for acts that cannot be attributed to an identifiable agent
or group of agents. These problems plague the theory of respondeat superior
because it does not provide a genuine theory of corporate entity culpability,
but rather works by borrowing the culpability of a corporate agent. The Model
Penal Code, in contrast, does contain a theory of corporate entity culpability,
but its conception is too narrow. It fails to take account of the fact that corporations may be "justly to blame" even without the direct participation, authorization or tolerance of high managerial officials. What is needed is a concept
of corporate culpability capable of assigning fault not only when high managerial officials are involved, but also when corporate rules, policies, structures or
procedures encourage criminal acts in less direct, more subtle, ways.
For such a concept, we must turn to a theory of corporate culpability
that has received considerable attention from academics, but has not been
explicitly adopted by the courts. This theory builds on the findings of organizational research by recognizing that corporations shape and control the behavior of their agents not only through direct supervision by high managerial
officials, but also through the use of such devices as standard operating procedures, hierarchical structures, decision rules and disciplinary sanctions. 122 As
noted in Part I, rules, structures, policies and procedures are appropriate loci
of corporate fault because they are intended to replace agents' decisional
autonomy with an organizational decision-making process. Their effect is to
create a corporate "culture" or "character" which endures over time and

120.
121.
122.

Brickey, supra note 106, at 628.
See idat 629-34.
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 34

which channels behavior in ways that are in the interest of the corporation. 123
Because this third theory of corporate culpability makes fault depend upon the
character of the corporation, it will be termed the "corporate character
theory." Under the corporate character theory, a corporation is culpable when
its policies, structures, or procedures-features of the corporate charactercause its agents to commit illegal acts on its behalf. Generally, the corporate
character theory is advanced as an alternative to the two theories of
corporate criminal liability presently in use at the trial stage. However, it can
also be used to assess the degree of a corporate offender's liability at sentencing. Indeed, in Part II.C.3., I will contend that the corporate character theory is
more suitable for use at sentencing than at trial. In Part III, I will argue that a
version of this theory has been adopted by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for organizations.
1. Contours of the CorporateCharacterTheory
There are many proponents of the corporate character theory, and each
has articulated the theory in a slightly different way. 124 Nevertheless, it is
possible to discern from the literature three distinct sets of circumstances
under which most corporate character theorists would find the corporation at
fault. First, and most straightforwardly, a corporation is culpable under the
corporate character theory if it has adopted a policy that is illegal, and an
agent of the corporation carries out that policy. In such a case, it is clear that
the resulting illegal act is a product of the corporate character, rather than the
act of a rogue employee, and that the corporation is "justly to blame." In some
cases, the illegal policy may be formally adopted by the company's board of
directors. However, for a board to formally authorize illegal activity is rare.
More often, illegal acts by corporate agents result from de facto illegal policies
which are communicated indirectly, or from policies which are not as such
illegal, but which a reasonable person would foresee would lead to violations
on the corporation's behalf. A practice of rewarding or failing to discipline
employees found guilty of past violations, for example, is likely to encourage
similar violations in the future. Inadequate instruction about legal standards
governing employees' day-to-day activities is likely to lead to violation of those
standards. In some industries, a policy of sharing information about production
costs with competitors is likely to lead to price-fixing.125 For this reason, the
corporate character theory holds that for a corporation to be culpable, it is not
necessary for it to have formally adopted the policy in question, nor is it necessary for the policy itself to be illegal. Rather, a corporation is justly to blame
123. See supra notes 56,60-63 and accompanying text.
124. One author, for example, argues that a corporation is justly to blame for the criminal
act of an agent if: 1) a corporate practice or policy violated the law, or 2) it was reasonably
foreseeable that a corporate practice or policy would result in a corporate agent's violation of the
law, or 3) the corporation adopted or ratified a corporate agent's violation of the law. Ann
Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of
CorporateMisconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1306 (1990). Another author contends that the
corporation is culpable when its "ethos" (that is, its culture or "characteristic spirit") "encourages
criminal conduct by agents of the corporation." Bucy, supra note 85, at 1121. For other
versions of the theory, see FRENCH, supra note 117; SCHLEGEL, supra note 67; Fisse, supra
note 67; Developments in the Law, supra note 85, at 1257.
125. See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Paul Lawrence, Why Do Companies Succumb to Price
Fixing?, HARV. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1978, at 145.
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for the illegal act of an agent whenever it was reasonably foreseeable that a
corporate policy or practice would lead to the crime. 126 The effect of this
principle is to adopt a negligence standard for corporate fault. Under the theory, culpability would be established by proof that a certain policy or practice
was part of the day-to-day operation of the organization, and by a showing
that the policy or practice was the proximate cause of the crime.
Second, like the Model Penal Code, most versions of the corporate
character theory find the corporation culpable when an illegal act is committed, authorized, ordered or endorsed by a high managerial official in the corporation. 127 As the drafters of the Model Penal Code recognized, some corporate
officials are so closely identified with the organization and have so much
authority within it, that their acts per se count as "corporate policy."'128 The
participation of a high managerial official in an illegal act makes it extremely.
likely that the act will be carried out. It is difficult to imagine an organization
with a "good" character whose officials tolerate or participate in criminal
activity. Of course, the question of who counts as a high managerial official is
a difficult one, heavily dependent on the circumstances in each case.
Generally, the higher an official, the more likely it is that he or she does represent corporate policy; but lower officials may also represent corporate policy if
they have been delegated sufficient discretion.
Third, several corporate character theorists argue that a corporation
should be found culpable of an employee's illegal act if it implicitly ratifies or
endorses the violation. There are at least two ways in which such ratification
can take place. First, the organization may fail to correct a particular violation
once it is discovered.129 Even if an act is initially committed by a rogue
employee, failure to correct it suggests that the violation is consistent with
corporate policy. Second, the organization may have a history of similar violations. Such a history suggests that the crimes are not mere anomalies, but are
the result of some feature of the corporation; failure to correct the circumstances leading to the violation endorses it by implication. In both cases, there
is strong evidence that the bad act is a product of the corporate character.
Similar assumptions are commonly made in making judgments about the culpability of individuals. While a first offender can plausibly repudiate his crime
by arguing that the crime does not genuinely reflect his character, this argu126. See Foerschler, supra note 124, at 1308-09. But see Bucy, supra note 85, at 1138
(arguing that involvement of high managerial officials is "not decisive").
127. This feature often appears implicitly, rather than explicitly, in the various versions of
the corporate character theory. For example, some theorists state that a corporation is culpable
when an act by a lower official is endorsed or ratified by a higher official. See Foerschler, supra
note 125, at 1310. Others claim that the involvement of high managerial officials is "not
decisive," see Bucy, supra note 85, at 1138, but list other factors, such as the corporate
hierarchy or the response of high level officials to employee wrongdoing, that suggest the close
relation of high managerial officials to corporate policy. Id. at 1101. See also FRENCH, supra
note 117 (arguing that the corporation should be given an opportunity to rebut responsibility for
the acts of high officials that are not consistent with corporate policy, but making identification
of corporate policy depend on "recognitors" that include the position of policy-makers in the
corporate hierarchy). These variations suggest that, while corporate character theorists may
disagree about the level of the corporate hierarchy at which the acts of officials are identified with
company policy, there is some level at which such an identification can be made.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
129. Foerschler, supra note 124.
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ment is not persuasive for a recidivist. Repetition of a crime, and failure to
respond appropriately to the harms it caused, suggests that the crime was not
30
a mistake, but a genuine outgrowth of the character of the offender.1
Finally, though few of its proponents have addressed the issue
directly,131 the corporate character theory is best understood as containing a
"benefit" requirement similar to that found in the doctrine of respondeat superior and the Model Penal Code. An act which harms the corporation, or which
is clearly committed solely for the benefit of an individual agent, is not one for
which a corporation would be found culpable under the corporate character
theory. Indeed, the theory suggests a rationale for the benefit requirement:
Under the corporate character theory, culpability is located in features of the
organization which are intended to replace individual decisional autonomy with
an organizational decision-making process. When an agent acts solely for his
or her own benefit, or actively harms the organization, it is clear that this
replacement process has failed. An act that harms the organization or that
was committed for solely individual gain is unlikely to be a product of organizational policy.
Although it is difficult to anticipate the precise results if it were to be
adopted at the trial stage, the corporate character theory appears to avoid
problems presented by both the doctrine of respondeat superior and the Model
Penal Code. Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, the corporate character theory does not hold that a corporation is culpable for all criminal acts
committed by corporate agents on its behalf, but requires a showing that a
corporate policy or practice proximately caused the crime. It thus avoids the
32
problem of overinclusiveness noted in Part II.A.1. In the Hilton Hotels case,
for example, the corporate character theory would most likely find the
corporation not culpable, because the violation appeared to be the result of
personal pique on the part of the corporate agent, and there was no evidence
of a corporate policy or practice which gave rise to the crime.
Moreover, the corporate character theory avoids the problem of underinclusiveness posed by respondeat superior liability without resorting to the
133
fiction of "collective knowledge." In United States v. Bank of New England,
the corporate character theory would hold the corporation at fault for its
agent's violation of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act, not because the
partial knowledge of several employees could be combined to comprise the
required mental state, but because the company maintained a poor reporting
network which prevented officials from acquiring complete information, and
failed to train its employees in the requirements of the Act. Both practices are
reasonably likely to result in violations. Similarly, there is no need to invoke

130. See FRENCH, supra note 117; Fisse, supra note 67. Both French and Fisse argue for
what they call "retroactive fault," under which a corporation can be regarded as "culpable" for an
earlier act if it later commits another offense of the same type. This is an implausible claim if, as
French suggests, the later event reaches back and renders the corporation morally responsible for
the earlier offense. FRENCH, supra note 117, at 155. However, it is quite reasonable if it is seen
as an inference about the character of the corporate offender.
131. But see Bucy, supra note 85, at 1150.
132.

United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied,

409 U.S. 1125 (1973). See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
133. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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collective knowledge in T.LM.E.-D.C.,134 the case in which a trucking
company adopted a policy marking drivers who called in sick "unexcused"
unless they submitted verification from a doctor. Although absences could be
marked excused retroactively upon presentation of a doctor's note, this was
not clearly conveyed to the drivers. Many sick drivers came to work in.order
to avoid a loss in pay, violating a statute prohibiting driving while ill. Because
the "aura of confusion and concern"135 created by the policy was reasonably
likely to lead to violations of the statute, the corporation would be found
culpable under the corporate character theory.
The corporate character theory also avoids the problems of underinclusiveness presented by the Model Penal Code. Corporations would still be held
liable when high managerial officials authorize, participate in, or recklessly
tolerate criminal activity, but the involvement of high managerial officials is
only one source of liability. The corporate character theory recognizes that
illegal activity also results from de facto policies not traceable to individual
officials. Under the corporate character theory an organization could not
evade liability for pervasive illegal activity simply because it was impossible to
show the involvement of a high managerial official.
The corporate character theory is not without precedent. An analogue
to the theory can be found in the tort doctrine of municipality liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a statute creating a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 136 In Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services,137 the Supreme Court overturned a 1961
holding that municipalities were immune from § 1983 liability, and ruled that
municipalities can be held liable under the statute. 38 However, the Court
rejected a respondeat superior theory for municipalities. 39 Instead, it held that
a municipality is only liable where the municipal entity itself is at fault, that is,
where a policy or custom of the municipality was the "moving force"' 40 behind
the injury:
[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
134. 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974). See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying
text.
135. IL at 736.
136. Any person who, "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State ...
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...
to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
137. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
138. Id at 664-89. Monell overturned Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar as
it held that municipalities were not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983, and thus could not
be held liable under the statute.
139. The Court stated that municipalities could not be held liable under a doctrine of
respondeat superior for two reasons: 1)Although Congress had the constitutional power to hold
municipal governments liable for their own acts, it may not have the power to require municipal
governments to control others. This meant that any act falling under the purview of § 1983 must
be an act of the municipal entity, and not merely an act of the munipality's agent. Monell, 436
U.S. at 693.2) The language of § 1983 required a causal connection in order for one party to be
held liable for the acts of another. This meant that the act must be caused by the municipality
itself, not just by the municipality's agent. Id. at 694.
140. Id. at 694.
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held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superiortheory ....
Instead, it
is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made

by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.141
Municipalities may incur liability under § 1983 in two ways, the Court
explained. First, municipalities are liable where an unconstitutional act implements a policy that has been officially adopted and/or promulgated by a local
governing body. 142 Monell itself, which involved an official policy requiring
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence, was this kind of case.
But municipalities may also be held liable for "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to a governmental 'custom,' even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels."'143 Quoting Justice Harlan in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the Court
reasoned that "Congress included customs and usages [in § 1983] because of
the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials ...
Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could
well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage'
with the force of law."l"
There are, of course, significant differences between the legal context of
the doctrine of municipality liability and that of the corporate character theory,
as well as substantive differences between the two. 145 Courts have generally
employed a higher standard of fault for municipal liability than the one
proposed by adherents of the corporate character theory-a standard of gross
negligence or deliberate indifference rather than one of negligence. In addition,
recent Supreme Court decisions have cut back on the doctrine of municipality
46
liability in ways that significantly diminish the role of informal custom.
Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the two theories is the same: the rejection of
respondeat superior liability in favor of a doctrine of "organizational fault," and
the location of such fault in the policies and customs of the organization. 147 For
this reason, the doctrine of municipality liability provides at least a partial legal
model for the corporate character theory, and its development provides some
information about how the theory might work in practice.

141.
142.
143.
144.

J.)).

1&at 691-94.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 691.
Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970) (Harlan,

145. Municipality liability under § 1983 is a tort doctrine, not a theory of criminal liability;
municipalities are public, not private corporations, and thus there may be reasons for shielding

them from liability that do not apply to corporations. Finally, the standard of liability under
§ 1983 is a result of statutory language which requires that a person violate or cause another to
violate the victim's constitutional rights before liability can attach.
146. See infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
147. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[W]ithout some evidence of municipal policy or custom independent of the [individual agent's]
misconduct, there is no way of knowing whether the city is at fault."). See also id., at 818
(plurality opinion); id.at 824.
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2. Municipality Liability Under § 1983
According to Monell, a municipality is liable under § 1983 where a
municipal policy or custom causes the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional
rights. MonelI thus raises two key questions: 1) What counts as a municipal
"policy" or "custom"? and 2) When does such a policy or custom "cause" a
violation? Because the answers to these questions frequently depend on the
same factual issues, courts have often blurred them, refusing to find a policy or
custom absent some evidence suggesting a causal link to the injury. In addition, courts have tied the answers to both questions to the question of a standard of fault for municipalities.
In Monell, both the question of the existence of a municipal "policy" or
"customn"1 48 and the question of causation were quite straightforward. The rule
that pregnant employees must take unpaid sick leave was formally approved
and promulgated as a city regulation, and because the rule was itself
unconstitutional, there was no question that it had "caused" a constitutional
violation. Monell offered little guidance, however, for cases in which the
alleged constitutional policy or custom had not been formally adopted or promulgated, or where the policy or custom was not unconstitutional, but was
merely alleged to have led to constitutional violations. In the years following
MoneIl, the lower courts found two sets of circumstances under which a
municipality could be found liable under § 1983, even if it had not formally
approved an unconstitutional policy.
First, courts held municipalities liable for unconstitutional acts by policymaking officials, even where such acts were one-time events, not intended to
establish city-wide routines. 149 In some jurisdictions,'only "final policy-making
authorities" or "ultimate repositories of power" were held to be sufficiently
identified with the municipality for their acts to constitute municipal policy per
se. In others, it was enough that the city had delegated final authority to perform the act or make the decision in question. In Williams v. Butler, 50 for
example, the Eighth Circuit held that a municipality could be held liable for a
traffic court judge's dismissal of his clerk in violation of her First Amendment
rights. Because the city had granted the judge "carte blanche authority" to
hire and fire, the court held, his action constituted a municipal policy under
Monell.151
148. Most courts have not distinguished between "policy" and "custom" in § 1983 cases.
149. See, e.g., Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1984), and cases cited
therein.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 436. The court held that where "a local governmental official ... is the 'final
authority or ultimate repository of ... power,' that official's 'conduct and decisions must
necessarily be considered those of one "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy"' for purposes of § 1983." Id. at 436 (quoting Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619
F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court noted that if there had been a procedure to protect the clerk
from constitutional violations, then the judge would not have had final authority and the
municipality would not have been liable. The court also noted that it was not the act of delegating
to the judge that was unconstitutional. See also Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1545-47
(11 th Cir. 1984) (city liable for unconstitutional discharge of police officer by police chief);
Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (city liable for unconstitutional
discharge of employee by supervisors with final authority over personnel decisions for city's
health and hospitals corporation); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1983) (police
chief's choice and implementation of practices and procedures constituted governmental
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Second, in a series of police brutality cases, courts held municipalities
liable for constitutional violations committed by police officers where the mu-

nicipality had a policy or custom of failing properly to train, supervise, or dis-

cipline members of the police force. Spell v. McDaniel,152 for example, held
that a city could be held liable for police misconduct where it it failed to institute procedures to ensure the safety of people in custody, failed to investigate

charges of misconduct or to discipline officers who were known to have
committed abuse, and established quota systems for arrests and citations that
encouraged the use of force. 153 In some jurisdictions, courts required a
showing of a widespread "pattern" of constitutional violations before inferring
a municipal policy or custom.15 4 Other courts rejected the pattern requirement,
holding that "while some causal link must be made between the county's
failure to train and the violation of constitutional rights, a single brutal incident
...
may be sufficient to suggest that link.... 'A city's citizens do not have to
endure a "pattern" of past police misconduct before they can sue the city
under section 1983."155 In all the police brutality cases, the causal link
required between policy and violation was a strong one. The violation must
have been a "reasonable probability," "almost inevitable," or "substantially
1 56
certain" to result from the policy before a municipality was found at fault.
The effect was the adoption of a "deliberate indifference" or "gross negligence" standard of fault.
Recent Supreme Court cases have cut back on both of these rationales.
1 57 the Court endorsed the
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
view that the act
of a policy-making official could constitute municipal policy for purposes of
§ 1983, but narrowed the meaning of "policy-making official" to mean the
official or officials who, under state law, are granted final authority to set pol"policy," but evidence insufficient to conclude that chief had encouraged a policy of police
brutality); McKinley v. Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) (city liable for unconstitutional
discharge of police officer by city manager with final authority over personnel decisions); Black
v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982) (city liable
for policy promulgated by police chief which led to filing of false charges by police officer
against a citizen complainant). But see Bennett v. Sliddell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984), in
which the Fifth Circuit held that the local governing body itself must have acted
unconstitutionally or must have been directly responsible for the policy pursuant to which the
unconstitutional act was taken. Unless the governing body expressly or impliedly appointed the
official to act in its place, the body cannot be held responsible for acts of that official, even if the
authorities were final authorities on the decision in question. The Supreme Court later endorsed
the Fifth Circuit's position in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality
opinion). See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
152. 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987).
153. Id. at 1392.
154. Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983); Herrera v.
Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697
(10th Cir. 1979); Popow v. Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979).
155. Owen v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Leite v. City of
Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1978)). See also Hays v. Jefferson County,
668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196,
201 (2d Cir. 1980). In Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, City of
Shepherdsville, Kentucky v. Rymer, 473 U.S. 901 (1985), affd on remand, 775 F.2d 756 (6th
Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit took a similar position, and held that the amount of training
necessary to avoid such an inference is a question for the jury.
156. Rymer, 754 F.2d at 200.
157. 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion). See also City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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icy in the relevant area of the city's business. Under this definition, the decision of the judge to fire his clerk, at issue in Butler, would not constitute
municipal policy because, although the judge has the authority to hire and fire
employees, he does not have authority under state law to make employment
59 the Court went on to
policy for the city.158 In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,1
state that only officials whose decisions are not subject to review by any
higher authority properly have "final" power, suggesting that only the very
highest city officials are "policy-makers" for the purposes of § 1983.160 Any
broader definition, the Court argued, would collapse the Monell doctrine into a
version of respondeat superior.161
In addition, the Court has nearly eliminated the possibility of municipality
liability on the basis of an informal, de facto policy developed and carried out
by lower municipal officials, and has moved progressively toward the view
that a municipal policy cannot exist in the absence of intentional choice by
policy-making officials. In Pembaur, for example, the Court held that
"municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives" by city policy-makers. 162 The Court has not entirely closed off the
avenue of custom, because it has conceded that in rare cases, police misconduct may be so widespread and egregious, or a training program so obviously
poor, that city policy-makers can be said to have deliberately authorized the
violation.163 But these cases, the Court suggests, will be rare. 164 In addition, the
Court has held that municipal liability can never be based solely on a single
incident; rather, a "pattern" of constitutional violations is required. 165 Again,
the Court seems to believe that, without such standards, the Monell doctrine
will collapse into a version of respondeat superior:
To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance

where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a
city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the
city "could have done" to prevent the unfortunate incident. Thus,

permitting cases against cities for their failure to train employees to go
forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de
facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities-a result we
rejected in Monell. 166
If the point is to distinguish municipality liability from respondeat superior, however, the Court went further than it needed to. Under respondeat
sup rior, a municipality is liable for the torts of its employees "solely because
it employed a tort-feasor,"167 regardless of municipal fault. To avoid collapsing
into respondeat superior, the doctrine of municipality liability need only insist
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12.
485 U.S. 112 (1988).
Id.at 126.
ld.at 124-25.

162.

475 U.S. at 483-84.

163.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).

164. Id. at 390 ("It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will
actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees.").
165. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
166. Harris, 489 U.S. at 391-92.
167. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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on some fault standard, not necessarily one of "conscious choice" or
"deliberate indifference." For example, it would be possible to adopt a negligence standard, under which municipalities would be found liable when they
have policies or customs that are reasonably likely to result in constitutional
violations. To be sure, this approach would expose municipalities to
"unprecedented liability," but it would not collapse the Monell decision into a
form of respondeat superior.
The Supreme Court's requirement that a policy be the product of an
intentional choice on the part of policy-making officials conflates two analytically distinct questions-that of the existence of a policy or custom and that of
the appropriate standard of fault. The existence of a municipal policy can be
established on the basis of evidence independent of fault, such as testimony
from municipal employees and city residents, internal records, and other documents tending to show that the practice in question has become part of the
municipality's ordinary course of business. Whether and at what level the policy must be consciously adopted, and the strength of the link required between
the policy and the violation, are separate questions.
As noted above, moreover, organizational theory suggests that tacitly
accepted, de facto policies may have a more significant impact on the operation of an organization than policies that are formally adopted and promulgated. Making a "conscious choice among alternatives" a prerequisite for the
existence of a policy places violations caused by such policies beyond the
reach of § 1983. Similarly, organizational theory suggests that it is not merely
the behavior of employees who are "final policy-making authorities" as a
matter of state law that shapes the character and ethos of the municipality. As
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik:
Every act of a high official constitutes a kind of "statement" about how
similar decisions will be carried out; the assumption is that the same
decision would have been made, and would again be made, across a
class of cases. Lower officials do not control others in the same way.
Since their actions do not dictate the responses of various subordinates,
those actions lack the potential of controlling governmental decisionmaking; they are not perceived as the actions of the city itself. If a
County police officer had ... [committed the constitutional violation] on
the officer's own initiative, this would have been seen as the action of
an overanxious officer, and would not have sent a message to other
officers that similar actions would be countenanced. One reason for
this is that the County Prosecutor himself could step forward and say
"that was wrong"; when the County Prosecutor authorized the action
himself, only a self-correction would accomplish the same task,
and
168
until such time his action would have countywide ramifications.
Because an order from the County Prosecutor does send a message that
"similar actions will be countenanced," it is likely to lead to similar violations in
the future, and contributes to a "bad character" on the part of the municipality.
Whether a person is the kind of official whose actions "dictate the
responses of ... subordinates" is, of course, a heavily fact-dependent question.
If it is widely known that an official has little de facto power in the area in
question, or that, if a superior were approached, the likelihood that the order
168.

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 170-71 (1988).
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would be countermanded is high, the official's action might not send the message Justice Stevens fears. Nevertheless, limiting those who can act for the
city to "final policy-makers" under state law will often foreclose the question
of municipal culpability in a needlessly formalistic way. Again, limiting the tort
liability of municipalities may be desirable as a matter of policy, but it is not a
necessary outcome of the theory underlying Monell.
3. Implementing the Corporate CharacterTheory
Most proponents of the corporate character theory argue for its adoption as a theory of corporate criminal liability. 169 Because the corporate
character theory holds corporations liable when and only when they are culpable, proponents contend, the theory comes closer than either the doctrine of
respondeat superior or the Model Penal Code to realizing the principle of
responsibility discussed in Part 1.170 It thus contributes to fairness, deterrence
in the broad sense, and liberty in corporate criminal law.
Moreover, Monell's presence on the legal landscape suggests that the
use of the corporate character theory at the trial stage is not impracticable.
Courts have proved capable of assigning liability based on the existence of an
organizational policy or custom and the causal connection between policy or
custom and a legal violation. Of course, the Monell doctrine in its present form
results in liability far more limited in scope than that proposed by corporate
culpability theorists. But the narrow scope of Monell represents a policy
choice; it is not an inevitable outgrowth of the focus on organizational policy
and custom. It would be possible to recast the doctrine in the context of the
private corporation, where the arguments for protection against liability are
less strong.
Nevertheless, the courts' struggle to articulate and apply the doctrine of
municipality liability justifies some caution in adopting the corporate character
theory for use at the trial stage. There are several reasons to be hesitant about
adopting a theory of corporate criminal liability based on the corporate character theory. First, as the case law following Monell shows, the question of
whether an organizational policy or custom causes a violation requires a difficult, fact-dependent inquiry. An assessment of the "character" of an organization involves several different variables, among them the existence of an
"official" policy or custom, the degree of involvement of policy-making officials, the strength of the link between the policy and the violation, the existence of de facto authority, and the prior history of the organization. Moreover,
the case law suggests that these variables are interdependent: Where a policy
is merely de facto, or the creation of lower-level officials, a finding of liability is
likely to require a stronger link between policy and violation than is needed
where final policy-making officials expressly adopt and promulgate a policy
that leads to violations. Similarly, the existence of a "pattern" of similar violations in the organization's history makes it more likely that policy-making officials are involved. The multiplicity of variables and their interdependence suggests that the question of liability under the corporate character theory is what

169.
170.

See theorists cited supra note 124.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Lon Fuller has called a "polycentric" problem,171 not easily amenable to
traditional adjudication. Although the theory is capable of assessing the degree
of a corporation's culpability, it may be ill-suited to produce a verdict of
"guilty" or "not-guilty," the only two alternatives at the trial stage.
Second, making liability dependent on proof that a corporate policy or
custom caused an agent's violation of the law places an enormous burden on
prosecutorial resources. Evidence of prior incidents of similar conduct may be
fairly accessible to the prosecution, but other evidence of policy or custom is
likely to be internal to the organization: corporate records, internal memos, and
the cooperation of witnesses whose interests may be adverse to those of the
government. This difficulty is partially avoided if, as some proponents of the
theory recommend, a corporation is presumed liable for a criminal act on the
part of its agent, and is permitted to defeat liability by a showing that no corporate policy or custom caused the violation.172 But this approach, while not
constitutionally impermissible, stands in tension with the due process value of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials. 173
.Third, the corporate character theory is in tension with evidentiary rules
designed to protect criminal defendants from conviction on the basis of bad
character. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), for example, restricts the admissibility of character evidence that is used to show that a defendant acted in
accordance with his or her character.174 Rule 404(b) limits the admissibility of
evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts to show that a defendant had a
propensity to commit the crime.17 5 In contrast, evaluation of the corporate
171. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395
(1978). According to Fuller, a polycentric problem is one with many centers, in which the
resolution of one question implicates several others:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull on one
strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a
whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of
the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of
tensions.... This is a 'polycentric' situation because it is 'many centered'--each
crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.
l
172. This suggestion is offered in Developments in the Law, supra note 85, at 1257.
173. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the Supreme Court held that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." This requirement
has been interpreted to mean merely that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every
element of the offense; it does not prevent the government from defining an offense in such a
way that what might have been included as an element becomes an affirmative defense that the
defendant has the burden of proving. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Thus,
it is unlikely that placing the burden on a corporate offender to prove that no policy or custom
caused a criminal violation would be found constitutionally impermissible. Nevertheless, if we
believe that corporate culpability should be a necessary element in most corporate crimes,
presupposing such culpability by placing the burden on the corporation to disprove it contradicts
the spirit of the Due Process Clause.
174. Rule 404(a) provides: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of providing action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,"
and provides exceptions for character evidence offered by an accused, prosecutorial evidence
offered in response to character evidence offered by an accused, evidence of a relevant character
trait of a victim, and some evidence offered to demonstrate the character of a witness. FED. R.
EvI). 404(a).
175. Rule 404(b) provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
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character and the propensity its policies and customs have to result in crime is
precisely what the corporate character theory requires. Moreover, an
assessment of corporate character is likely to require a wide-ranging inquiry,
broader than that traditionally conducted at trial. Although the numerous
exceptions to the rules of evidence mean that the rules are unlikely to pose a
genuine barrier to the use of the corporate character theory, 176 their presence
reveals the extent of the difference between the inquiry demanded by the
corporate character theory and that which presently takes place in a criminal
trial.
The problems discussed above do not pose insurmountable obstacles to
the adoption of the corporate character theory at trial; they merely indicate
points of tension between the theory and current criminal law. These tensions,
and the long entrenchment of the theories of respondeat superior and the
Model Penal Code, make imminent adoption of the corporate character theory
at the trial stage unlikely. At the sentencing stage, however, the tensions
between the corporate character theory and the criminal law disappear. The
existence of a corporate policy or custom that causes violations of the law
continues to be a fact-intensive, polycentric problem-but courts have traditionally dealt with such problems at sentencing. Unlike the trial stage, where
the fact-finder must find the defendant "guilty" or "not-guilty," the sentencing
judge attempts to determine the degree of the offender's culpability, a task to
which the corporate character theory is well-suited. Evidence of corporate
character is still difficult for the prosecution to obtain, but placing the burden
on the offender to bring forth evidence in mitigation of the crime is traditional
practice at sentencing, and does not threaten the principle of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, sentencing has never been governed by the restrictive rules of evidence that obtain at the trial stage. Determining the degree of
an offender's culpability involves a broad-ranging inquiry into questions as
diverse as past history, reputation in the community, and remorse. Indeed, the
ultimate goal of the sentencing inquiry is an assessment of the offender's
character. This makes the corporate character theory particularly well-suited
for the sentencing of corporations. In the following Part, I argue that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations adopt a version of the corporate character theory.
III. THE CORPORATE CHARACTER THEORY AND THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Part II showed that the "corporate character theory" is the most theoretically satisfying of the three principal theories of corporate culpability.
Under the corporate character theory, a corporation is culpable when a corporate policy or custom causes an agent of the corporation to violate the law on
the corporation's behalf. Although use of the corporate character theory at the
trial stage presents several difficulties, the theory is well-suited for use at
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EViD.
404(b).
176. For example, where character is directly relevant to an element of the offense, as it
would be in a defamation suit, character evidence is admissible. If the corporate character theory
were adopted, character would become an element of the offense and much evidence which is
currently regarded as collateral would have to be taken into account.
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sentencing, where judges have traditionally engaged in a broad-based
assessment of the character of offenders. In this section of the paper, I explain
the ways in which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are informed by the corporate character theory.
Given the traditional unimportance of culpability in corporate criminal
law, one would expect the Guidelines to ignore culpability altogether. At most,
the Guidelines would be expected to employ a concept of imputed culpability,
consistent with the doctrine of respondeat superior used at the trial stage in
the federal courts. Instead, Part III shows, the Guidelines adopt a genuine
theory of organizational entity culpability, and give it concrete content through
the device of the "culpability score." The argument of Part III is threefold:
Section A describes the evolution of the Guidelines and the decision of the
Sentencing Commission to make culpability a significant part of the sentencing
process. Section B analyzes the "culpability score" and concludes that the
Guidelines require an assessment of the organization's character strikingly
similar to that prescribed by the corporate character theory. Section C shows
how the adoption of a version of the corporate character theory enables the
Guidelines to pursue a wider range of sentencing aims than is traditional in the
sentencing of organizations.
A. The Use of Culpability in the OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Commission did not initially regard culpability as important to organizational sentencing. The first proposed draft of the Guidelines,
issued in 1988,177 contained no mention of culpability and adopted what has
come to be called the "optimal penalty" approach to sentencing. 178 Under the
optimal penalty approach, the goal of criminal law is to minimize the total
social costs of crime-the costs of both crime and punishment-to arrive at
an optimal level of deterrence. This goal is achieved when an offender is fined
an amount equal to the total cost of the offense times a multiple representing
the probability that the offender will be caught. Proponents of optimal penalties
predict that under an optimal penalty regime, organizations will invest in crime
prevention up to the point at which the cost of prevention equals the expected
cost of the harm, but will not be overdeterred.
Following these principles, the 1988 draft focused primarily on deterrence, 179 and relied almost exclusively on monetary sanctions. Courts were
directed to set fines by determining the monetary costs of the offense (called
the "offense loss"), multiplying this number by a figure representing the likelihood of detection (the "offense multiple"), and adding enforcement costs.
177. Discussion Draft of Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statementsfor Organizations,
reprintedin 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 7 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Discussion Draft].
178. The optimal penalty approach was pioneered by Gary Becker in Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968). For a defense of the
optimal penalty approach in corporate sentencing, see Michael'K. Block, Optinal Penalties,
CriminalLaw and the Control of CorporateBehavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1991); Jeffrey S.
Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal
Penalties,26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513 (1989) [hereinafter Parker, Optimal Penalties];Jeffrey
S. Parker, The CurrentCorporate Sentencing Proposals:History and Critique, 3 FED. SENT.
R. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Parker, CorporateSentencing Proposals].
179. Restitution was also an important feature of the 1988 Discussion Draft. See 1988
Discussion Draft, supra note 177, § 8C2.1, at 50.
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There was no provision for aggravating or mitigating factors in the calculation
of the fine. The draft did authorize probation for organizational offenders in
addition to fines, restitution, and forfeitures, but probation was viewed primarily as a means of enforcing the payment of monetary penalties. 'Preventive"
probation-judicial oversight of the operation of the organization to prevent
future crime-was authorized only in rare cases.18 0
By the Commission's 1990 proposal,' 8' the Guidelines had changed
shape considerably. Fines remained the primary weapon in the Commission's
punitive arsenal, and they were still arrived at by multiplying an initial figure by
a "multiplier." But the initial figure was no longer determined solely by the
costs of the offense,182 and the multiplier was derived from the organization's
"mitigation score," a number which depended on factors related to the
corporation's culpability, 8 3 rather than on the chances of detection. The final
version of the Guidelines, sent to Congress on May'l, 1991, stated explicitly
that the appropriate punishment depends in part on culpability, and changed.
the term "mitigation score" to "culpability score." The May 1 Guidelines
became chapter eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and took effect on
November 1, 1991.
The new Guidelines are complex and reflect a broad range of sentencing principles. Section 8B requires offenders to remedy any harm resulting
from an offense and to compensate victims. It also provides for restitution
18 7
orders, 184 remedial orders, 185 community service,18 6 and notice to victims.
Section 8C1 subjects "criminal purpose organizations" to the organizational
equivalent of the death penalty-a fine large enough to divest them of all their
assets. 8 8 Criminal purpose organizations are defined as organizations
1 89
operating "primarily for criminal purposes or primarily for criminal means."'
Section 8C2.9 provides for the disgorgement of any gain from an offense that
is not removed by fine or restitution order. The central portions of the
Guidelines, however, are the provisions for fines for non-criminal purpose
organizations and the provisions for probation. In both portions, culpability
plays a substantial role.
The principle underlying section 8C2 (fines for non-criminal purpose
organizations) is that "the fine range ... should be based on the seriousness of
the offense and the culpability of the organization." 90 The seriousness of an
180. The draft authorized "preventive probation" only where 1) the offense was a felony;
2) senior management participated in or encouraged the bffense; 3) the organization or senior
management had a history of similar offenses, and 4) the court determines that the offense is
likely to recur, and probation is likely to prevent recurrence in a cost-justified manner. 1988
Discussion Draft, supra note 177, § 8D2.1(c), at 65. Interestingly, three of these factors are
circumstances in which the organization would be found culpable under the corporate character

theory.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

1990 Draft Guidelines, supranote 4.
Id. § 8C.2.1 at 2007.
Id. § 8C2.1 at 2012.
U.S.S.G. § 8Bl.1.
Id. § 8B1.2.
Id. § 8B1.3.
Id. § 8B11.4.
Id. § 8C1.1.

189.

Id.

190.

Id. ch. 8, intro..cmt.
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offense is represented by its appropriate "base fine." An organization's culpability depends on its "culpability score." A sentencing judge is directed to
start with the base fine, and multiply it by a set of numbers derived from its
culpability score to arrive at the "guideline fine range." Adjustments within the
range and, in special cases, departures from the range, determine the final fine
(See Figure 1).
An organization's base fine is determined in one of three ways,
whichever results in the highest base fine. 191 First, the base fine may be set at
the amount of money gained by the organization from the crime. Second, "to
the extent the offense was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly," the
1 92
base fine may be set at the amount of monetary loss caused by the offense.
Finally, in cases in which neither monetary loss nor monetary gain are high
enough to adequately reflect the severity of the offense, the court is directed
to turn to chapter two of the Guidelines, where crimes are ranked according
to their seriousness. From this ranking, termed the crime's "offense level,"
section 8C2 then assigns a corresponding fine. The base fine is whichever of
monetary gain, monetary loss (when
the three numbers is the highest:
193
applicable), or offense level fine.

191.

Id. § 8C2.4.

192. Commentary to the Guidelines states that "[iun order to ensure that organizations will
seek to prevent losses intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused by their agents, this section
provides that, when greatest, pecuniary loss is used to determine the base fine in such
circumstances." Id. § 8C2.4 cmt., backg'd.
193. In some cases, Chapter Two of the Guidelines offers specific instructions regarding
the determination of the base fine. Those instructions are to be followed in such cases. Id.
§ 8C2.4(b). In addition, where the calculation of loss or gain would "unduly complicate or
prolong the sentencing process," the court is directed to use the offense level fine. Id.
§ 8C2.4(c).
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Determining the Fine for Non-Criminal Purpose Organizations
STEP I

STEP 2

victim or society

STEP 3

t

STEP 4

(

from the"

Culpability Score
1. Involvement in or
tolerance of criminal
activity
2. Prior history
3. Violation of an order
4. Obstruction of justice
5. Effective program to
prevent and detect
violations of law

Figure 1194

194. Offense levels in Step 1 are determined by referring to the provisions of chapter two
or, in the case of multiple counts, chapter three of the Guidelines. Once the offense level is
determined, U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4 prescribes the following fines for each offense level:
Offense
Offense
Level
Fine
Level
Fine
6 or less
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

$5,000
7,500
10,000
15,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
60,000
85,000
125,000
175,000
250,000
350,000
500,000
650,000
910,000
1,200,000

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38 or more

$1,600,000
2,100,000
2,800,000
3,700,000
4,800,000
6,300,000
8,100,000
10,500,000
13,500,000
17,500,000
22,000,000
28,500,000
36,000,000
45,500,000
57,500,000
72,500,500

Pecuniary loss may be used to determine the base fine only "to the extent the loss was
caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." Id. § 8C2.5(a)(3).
Under § 8C2.6, the following multipliers are applicable to each culpability score
(Step 2):
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Once the court has determined the base fine, it calculates the organization's culpability score. Convicted organizations begin the sentencing process
with a culpability score of five. The score can be raised to as high as ten or
reduced to as little as zero by the presence of one or more aggravating or
mitigating factors. 195 The four aggravating factors are 1) the involvement in or
tolerance of criminal activity by "high level" or "substantial authority" personnel; 2) a recent history of similar misconduct on the part of the organization; 3) violation of a judicial order or condition of probation; and 4) obstruction
of justice. The two mitigating factors are 1) the presence of "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" on the part of corporate agents
and 2) cooperation with law enforcement officials. Aggravating and mitigating
factors will be explored in more detail below. The base fine is multiplied by a
maximum and a minimum multiplier, which correspond to its culpability score,
to arrive at the organization's guideline fine range. For example, if an organization's base fine is $100,000, and its culpability score is six, $100,000 is multiplied by 1.2 and 2.4 to arrive at a fine range of $120,000-240,000.196
The court is entitled to consider both offense seriousness and culpability
again once the Guideline fine range is determined. The organization's role in
the offense, any prior criminal or civil misconduct that was not taken into
account in determining the culpability score, an unusually high or low culpability score, or the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor may warrant
adjustments within the range. 197 In addition, the court may consider any of the
purposes of sentencing set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.198 In unusual cases,

departures from the fine range are authorized on grounds of culpability as
well.199

Culpability also plays a major role in section 8D, on probation. The
"culpability score" is not referred to explicitly in this section, but several of the
aggravating and mitigating factors from the score re-appear. For organizations

195.

Culpability
Score
10 or more

Minimum
Multiplier
2.00

Maximum
Multiplier
4.00

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 or less

1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.05

3.60
3.20
2.80
2.40
2.00
1.60
1.20
0.80
0.40
0.20

Id. § 8C2.5.

196. Id. § 8C2.7. The figures 1.2 and 2.4 are the multipliers associated with a culpability
score of six. See supra Figure 1 & note 191.
197. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8.
198. Id. § 8C2.8(a)(10).
199. See id. § 8C4.11 (authorizes upward departures when the organization has a
culpability score above ten, and downward departures when the fine range is higher than
necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing and organizational culpability is exceptionally
low. In general, however, departures from the fine range are authorized on the basis of the
seriousness of the offense, not on the basis of culpability).
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with over fifty employees, for example, a court is required to order a term of
probation if the organization does not have an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law. 200 Where the organization or a high-level official
within the organization recently engaged in similar misconduct, probation is
likewise required. 201 As in the 1988 Draft, probation is used in conjunction with
other Guideline sanctions as a method of enforcement. Thus, courts are
directed to order probation if it is necessary to secure payment of restitution or
fine, to enforce a remedial order, or to ensure completion of community service. 20 2 But the most significant feature of the probation section is its authorization of intrusion into the organizational decision-making process to change
features of the organization that lead to crime. Development of a program to
prevent and detect violations of the law, for example, may be made a condition of probation. 203 This "incapacitation" and "rehabilitation" of the organization is predicated on the possibility of organizational culpability.
B. The OrganizationalGuidelines and the Corporate CharacterTheory
The Guidelines not only make organizational culpability a central feature
of their provisions on fines and probation, they give concrete content to the
notion of organizational culpability through the device of the organization's
"culpability score." Significantly, the aggravating and mitigating factors in the
score include the same features of the organization which serve as the locus
for organizational culpability under the corporate character theory: the conduct of high managerial officials, prior history, and corporate policies, customs,
and procedures. The Guidelines never explicitly adopt any theory of corporate
culpability, and they are not consistent with the corporate character theory in
every respect. Nevertheless, the determination of an organization's culpability
score under the Guidelines is best understood as an assessment of the character of the organization.
1. Participationof High ManagerialOfficials
As noted in Part II, corporate character theorists generally agree that
some organizational officials are so closely identified with the organization that
their acts can be said to represent corporate policy. Where such an official
authorizes, participates in, or knowingly tolerates a criminal act on the part of
an employee of the organization, the organization is therefore culpable. The
200.
201.

Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(3).
Id. § 8D1.l(a)(4),(5).

202. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(1).
203. Id. § 8D1.4(c)(1). Several other conditions of probation are also authorized. The
condition that the organization shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the
term of probation is required by the Sentencing Reform Act. The Act also requires that if the
offender was convicted of a felony, a fine, restitution, or community service must be ordered as
a condition of probation. Id. § 8D1.3. Other conditions are permissive rather than mandatory:
The court may order the organization to publicize, at its own expense, the nature of its offense,
its conviction, and the steps it will take to prevent similar offenses in the future; it may require
the organization to make periodic reports on its financial conditions and business operations to a
probation officer; it may demand that the organization submit to unannounced examinations of its
books and records, and to interrogation of its personnel; and it may order the organization to
inform the court or probation officer of any adverse changes in its business or financial
conditions. Finally, the court is authorized to impose other conditions that are "reasonably
related to the nature and circumstances of the offense" and "involve only such deprivations of
liberty or property as are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing." Id. § 8D1.3(c).
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Guidelines adopt a similar principle, stating that "an organization is more culpable when individuals who 'manage the organization or who have substantial
discretion in acting for the organization participate in, condone, or are willfully
ignorant of criminal, conduct." 204 In keeping with this principle, the Guidelines
make the participation of high managerial officials an aggravating factor in an
organizational offender's culpability score. Depending on the size of the
organization, the Guidelines add as many as five points to the score when "an
individual within high-level personnel of the organization [or the unit of the
organization within which the offense was committed] participated in,
condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense." 205 The additional five points
result in a 100-200% increase in the organization's base fine. "High-level
personnel" are defined as
individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who

have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization.
The term includes: a director; an executive officer; an individual in

charge of a major business or functional unit of the organization ... an
individual with substantial ownership interest. 20 6

"High level personnel" are not the only officials whose actions can
result in organizational culpability, however. As noted in Part II, even the participation of agents who do not have official authority to make policy may have
sufficient de facto authority to "send a message" to other members of the
organization that illegal acts "will be countenanced." 207 Whether a given
individual has such de facto authority is a difficult, fact-dependent question;
nevertheless, an attempt to avoid the issue by adopting a formalistic definition
of persons with policy-making authority is likely to result in culpable organizations being judged not at fault. The Guidelines avoid this temptation. Instead,
they add as many as five points to an organization's culpability score where
"tolerance by substantial authority personnel was pervasive throughout the
organization." 208 "Substantial authority personnel" are "individuals who within
the scope of their authority exercise a measure of discretion in acting on
behalf of the organization. ... Whether an individual falls within this category
must be determined on a case-by-case basis." 209 "Pervasiveness" depends
upon
the number, and degree of responsibility, of individuals within substan-

tial authority personnel who participated in, condoned, or were willfully
ignorant of the offense. Fewer individuals need to be involved for a
finding of pervasiveness if those individuals exercised a relatively high
degree of authority. 210

204. Id. § 8C2.5, cmt.
205. Id. § 8C2.5(b) makes the number of aggravation points earned from the involvement
of high-level or substantial authority personnel dependent on the size of the organization or
organizational unit. Organizations/units with 5000 or more employees receive five points; those
with 1000 or more receive four points; those with 200 or more receive three points; those with
50 or more receive two points; and those with 10 or more receive one point.
206. U.S.S.G. § 8Al, cmt. 3(b).
207. See supra text accompanying note 168.
208. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). Once the organization has as few as 50 employees, the
Guidelines cease adding points for pervasive tolerance by substantial authority personnel.

209.

Id. § 8A.l.1, cmt. 3(c).

210. Id. § 8C2.5, cmt. 4.
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The requirement that tolerance by substantial authority personnel must be
"pervasive" before points are added to the culpability score represents an
oversimplification, and may result in underestimating the culpability of some
organizations. Nevertheless, the Guidelines' approach is consistent with the
corporate character theory. When a practice is pervasive, it becomes a way
of doing business, part of the organizational decision-making process. It has an
influence that it would not have if only a single employee with "substantial
authority" had engaged in it. The more "pervasive" tolerance of illegal activity
is, in other words, the more likely it is that the activity represents an organizational custom or policy, and the more likely it is that the organization is culpable.
The Guidelines depart from the corporate character theory by giving
larger organizations or units more aggravation points, and smaller organizations fewer points, for the same level of official participation. 211 This strategy
would be understandable if it were part of a general attempt to punish large
organizations more harshly than smaller ones; but the Guidelines make no
systematic attempt to tailor punishment to organizational size.2 12 Instead, the
Sentencing Commission believes that, where the participation of high level
officials is concerned, the size of the organization is directly related to its culpability:
[A]s organizations become larger and their managements become
more professional, participation in, condonation of, or willful ignorance

of criminal conduct by such management is increasingly a breach of
trust or abuse of position. ... [A]s organizations increase in size, the

risk of criminal conduct beyond that reflected in the instant offense also
increases
whenever management's tolerance of that offense is pervasive.213
As principles of organizational culpability, however, these statements are
puzzling. The first principle seems to state that it is worse for the management
of a large organization to commit a crime than it is for that of a smaller organization. But this point speaks to the seriousness of the offense, not to the culpability of the organization. As for the second principle, although it is true that
where management tolerates crime, a large firm can do more damage than a
smaller one, it is not clear that such tolerance makes criminal behavior more
likely in a larger firm. Indeed, precisely the opposite may be true. The more
closely held the corporation, the more high-level personnel are the firm, the
more influence their acts have over the organizational decision-making process, and the more control they exert over subordinates. In a larger firm, highlevel personnel are further removed from those who carry out their orders,
and the organizational decision-making structure is more complex. Thus, small
firms whose officials tolerate illegal activity may well be more culpable than
larger firms.
2. PriorHistory
The question of whether a defendant is a first-time or repeat offender
has long been central to the sentencing of individual criminals. Before the
211.
212.
213.

See supranote 205.
See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5, cmt., backg'd.
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advent of the "just deserts" school, information about an offender's prior conduct was considered essential because it enabled the court to determine the
need for incapacitation and the offender's susceptibility to rehabilitation. As
Andrew von Hirsch points out, however, an offender's past conduct is also
relevant to his or her culpability and "desert." 214 A first offender can plausibly
argue that an offense was an anomaly, a lone departure from past standards
of behavior. The act should not really be attributed to him, the offender can
argue, because it was not "in character." After the first offense, however, this
claim lacks credibility. Repetition has the effect of "endorsing" the earlier
offense. It becomes safe to conclude that subsequent offenses are genuinely a
product of the offender's character.
A similar argument can be made in the organizational context. Repeat
offenses by an organization suggest that the offenses are not mere anomalies,
but were caused by some feature of the organizational entity. Moreover, the
fact that the organization has not changed this feature to prevent further
offenses indicates that the offenses are consistent with the organization's policy or character. The corporate character theory builds on this insight by
holding that repeated misconduct on the part of an organization constitutes a
"ratification" or "endorsement" of its agent's criminal acts. 215 Where the
organization is a recidivist, its crimes cannot be dismissed as the acts of a
"rogue employee."
Consistent with the corporate character theory, the Guidelines take account of prior history by adding one point to the culpability score of an organizational offender if it "committed any.part of the instant offense" within ten
years after either a "criminal adjudication based on similar misconduct" or a
"civil or administrative adjudication based on two or more separate instances
of similar misconduct." 21 6 Two points are added if the instant offense took
place within five years of the criminal or civil adjudication. 21 7 "Similar misconduct" is defined as "prior conduct that is similar in nature to the instant
offense, without regard to whether or not such conduct violated the same
statutory provision." 2 18 For example, the Guidelines explain that prior
Medicare fraud would constitute misconduct similar to an offense involving
another type of fraud.219 Additional points are added to the culpability score
if
220
the offense violated a judicial order, injunction, or condition of probation.
Because prior conduct is one of the most important and accessible
sources of evidence about the character of the organization, the Guidelines
would have been justified in giving it more weight in the culpability score than
they do. In contrast to participation by high level officials, recidivism earns an
offending organization relatively few aggravation points. 221 In addition, by
214.
215.

voN HIRSCH, supra note 44, at 82.

216.

U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(c).

See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.

217. Id. '
218. Id. § 8Al, cmt. 3(f).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 8C2.5(d) represents a separate provision under which aggravation points are
added to the organization's culpability score for "violation of an order."
221. Assigning more aggravation points for a history of similar offenses is not the only
way to make use of the insight'that repeated offenses reflect a bad corporate character. John
Coffee has suggested that any mitigation credit awarded an organizational offender for an
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requiring a "prior civil or criminal adjudication," the Guidelines fail to build
misconduct not resulting in litigation into the culpability score. Nevertheless,
even one aggravation point raises a fine by twenty to forty percent, and courts
are given some authorization to take prior conduct into account at other points
in the Guidelines. When determining the fine within the Guideline range, for
example, the court is permitted to consider "any prior civil or criminal misconduct that was not considered" in the culpability score. 222 Conduct that is not
similar to the instant offense is not as probative of culpability as is similar conduct, but it may suggest an organizational culture characterized by indifference
to legal compliance. The court may also take into account "partial but incomplete satisfaction of the conditions for one or more of the mitigating or aggravating factors" set forth in the culpability score. 223 Thus the Guidelines'
inclusion of prior conduct in the culpability score is generally sound, and is
consistent with the corporate character theory.
3. Obstnction of Justice and Cooperation with Authorities
The Guidelines add three points to the organization's culpability score if
the organization willfully obstructed justice, attempted to obstruct justice, or
failed to prevent obstruction of justice during the investigation, prosecution or
sentencing of the organization's offense.2 24 This aggravating factor is best
understood in conjunction with a mitigating factor of "self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility." 225 An organization that cooperates with
prosecutors not only avoids the addition of three points to its culpability score;
it may subtract five points from its score if "prior to an imminent threat of
disclosure" and "within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the
offense, [it] reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully
cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition
and
'226 If the
affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct.
organization did not report the offense, but fully cooperated and demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility, it is entitled to subtract two points from its culpability score. 227 Acceptance of responsibility
alone entitles the organization to
228
subtract one point from its score.
At first glance, ex-post obstruction of justice and cooperation with
authorities seem to have little to do with culpability. The corporate character
theory makes no mention of such post-offense behavior. The twin aggravating/mitigating factors seem primarily a way to lower law enforcement costs
and increase the likelihood of conviction. By making entry of a guilty plea and
admission of involvement in the offense "significant evidence of affirmative
effective program to prevent and detect crime should be granted on a provisional basis, and
revoked if the organization commits a similar offense within the next three to five years. John
Coffee, "Carrotand Stick" Sentencing: Structuring Incentivesfor OrganizationalDefendants,
3 FED. SENT. R. 126, 128 (Nov./Dec. 1990).

222. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8(a)(7).
223. ld § 8C2.8(a)(9).
224. Id. §8C2.5(e). For the provision to apply, the obstruction must have been committed
on behalf of the organization; attempts by an individual to conceal misconduct from the
organization do not qualify.
225. Id. § 8C2.5(g).
226. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
227. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(2).
228. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3)
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acceptance of responsibility, 229 the Guidelines encourage organizations to
plead guilty. In addition, self-reporting must be "thorough" in order for the
organization to qualify for the mitigation credit, and the Guidelines state that
"[a] prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to
identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible
for the criminal conduct." 230 These provisions encourage organizations to
uncover violations by their agents and to turn in the individuals responsible.
Nevertheless, cooperation with authorities and acceptance of responsibility are not irrelevant to culpability. They have long been important in the
sentencing of individuals. Although cooperation and acceptance of responsibility can involve an admission of guilt, they also express~remorse, contrition, and
renunciation of the crime. They are thus relevant to the broad-based character
assessment of the offender that has traditionally taken place at the sentencing
stage. Like the first offender who plausibly argues that his crime is not "in
character," the genuinely remorseful criminal distances himself from the
commission of the crime and expresses an intent to reform. Obstruction of
justice, in contrast, represents a continued identification with and continuation
of the crime.
Obstruction of justice and cooperation with authorities are also capable
of revealing organizational character. When an organization attempts to conceal a crime, it ratifies it, endorses it, and accepts it as its own. The protection
of an employee who has violated the law implies that it is the corporation's
policy to support such violations; an organization with a "good" character
would likely have disciplined or fired the offending employee. Eliminating a
criminal employee from the organizational decision-making process improves
the corporate character and represents an important first step in the reform of
the organization.
Because post-offense behavior is easily manipulable and may not represent genuine remorse and intent to reform, there is danger in giving it more
weight than pre-offense conduct in assessing culpability. The Guidelines
appear to do precisely this by allowing a cooperating organization not only to
avoid three additional points, but also to subtract as many as five points from
its culpability score. The only other factor that commands as many points is
the involvement of high-level personnel in large organizations. This emphasis
on post-offense behavior suggests that the Sentencing Commission intended
the culpability score to serve other ends in addition to culpability assessment.
Nevertheless, the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors for obstruction of justice and cooperation with authorities is not inconsistent with the task
of evaluating culpability or with the corporate character theory.
4. Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of the Law
The corporate character theory holds that an organization is at fault,
even when there is no involvement by policy-making officials, if an organizational policy or custom causes an agent of the organization to commit a violation on the organization's behalf. The policy or custom need not have been
229.
230.

Id. § 8C2.5, cmt. 13.
Id. § 8C2.5, cmt. 12.
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formally adopted, nor is it necessary for the policy itself to be illegal. 231 Rather,
a corporation is justly to blame for the illegal act of an agent whenever it was
reasonably foreseeable that a corporate policy or practice would lead to the
crime. The Guidelines provide no aggravating factor for offenses that are
caused by organizational policy or custom. Instead, they appear to assume a
causal link between policy and offense, and offer the organization the opportunity to rebut this assumption. To do so, the organization must show that the
offense occurred "despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law. '232 If it is successful, three points are subtracted from its culpability score.
Under the Guidelines, mitigation credit for an effective program is not
always available to the organizational offender. Where an individual within
"high-level personnel" or an individual responsible for administering and
enforcing a compliance program was involved in the offense, the credit does
not apply. The credit is also inapplicable if, after becoming aware of an
offense, the organization "unreasonably delayed" reporting it to the governa
ment. Finally, the involvement of "substantial authority personnel" creates
233
rebuttable presumption that the organization lacked an effective program.
The mitigation credit for an effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law is arguably the most innovative and controversial element in
the culpability score. The other factors, while new, are less novel: Attention is
given to the participation of high-level personnel in the Model Penal Code, and
prior history and cooperation with authorities are traditional elements of the
sentencing of individuals. It is in their use of the program to prevent and detect
crime that the Guidelines most clearly demonstrate their commitment to the
corporate character theory. Because they make mitigation depend on the existence of a discrete and identifiable compliance program, rather than on an
assessment of the general policies and customs of the organization, the
Guidelines' formulation differs from that of the corporate character theory and
has potentially different results. Results would be different if, as some critics
fear, the effective program to prevent and detect violations were a pro forma
matter, which could peacefully coexist with corporate policies and customs
that encourage crime. 234 More experience with the practical impact of the
Guidelines, of course, is necessary to assess this charge. However, the criteria
for an effective program are designed in such a way that if an organization's
policies or customs do cause an offense, the mitigation credit will probably be
denied. The Guidelines' formulation is thus likely to have the same results as
the corporate character theory.
The Guidelines state that "[tihe hallmark of an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law is that the organization exercised due dili231. If an organization were to formally adopt an illegal policy, it might fall into the
Guidelines' category of "criminal purpose organization" and be destined for dissolution.
232. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 221, at 126 (expressing the fear that "eight of the nine
possible mitigation points will be awarded if the corporation's lawyers have done their job
properly"); Parker, Corporate Sentencing Proposals,supra note 178, at 135 (suggesting that
"the principal means for [firms to reduce their penalty exposure] is for firms to engage in
activities that will earn them mitigation 'points' quite independently of whether they actually
prevent crime.").
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gence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its employees and
other agents." 235 The exercise of due diligence, in turn, requires several
specific steps. Among other things, the organization must establish clear
compliance standards reasonably capable of reducing the likelihood of violations; it must communicate them clearly to employees through training programs or written materials; it must monitor employees for compliance with the
standards; and it must consistently enforce the standards by disciplining individuals who violate them. 236 Generally, the larger the organization, the more
formal the program should be.237 When it detects an offense, the organization
must take "all reasonable steps" to prevent similar offenses, including any
necessary modifications of its program. 238 An organization is expected to pay
special attention to the possibility of offenses which, due to the nature of its
business, are particularly likely. Thus, for example, "[i]f an organization
employs sales personnel who have flexibility in setting prices, it must have
established standards and procedures designed to prevent and detect pricefixing." 239 Finally, an organization's prior history is used to determine what
kinds of offenses it should have anticipated, and repeated misconduct suggests
that the organization did not take all reasonable steps to prevent violations of
the law. 240 Significantly, the criteria for an effective program include precisely
the kinds of factors that are important in determining culpability under the
corporate character theory. In Part II, for example, we noted that the Bank of
New England would be found culpable under the corporate character theory
because it failed to instruct its employees adequately about the law and lacked
effective communication procedures. 241 In many of the police brutality cases,
violation of the Guidelines' prescribed steps was the source of municipality
liability under § 1983.242 It is likely, then, that an organization will receive
mitigation credit under the Guidelines when, and only when, it is not culpable
under the corporate character theory. 243
C. Corporate Culpability and the A ims of Corporate Criminal Law

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 sets out five purposes of criminal
sentencing: just punishment, adequate deterrence, protection of the public, the

235.

Id. § 8A1..1, cmt. 3(k).

236. Id. § 8AI.I, cmt. 3(k)(1)-(7).
237. Id § 8Al, cmt. (k)(7)(i).
238. Id. § 8Al, cmt. (k)(7).
239. Id. § 8A1.1, cmt. (k)(7)(ii).
240. Id. § 8Al, cmt. (k)(7)(iii).
241. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Bank of
New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987)).
242. See supra text accompanying note 153.
243. The fact that the credit for an effective program is not available when high-level
personnel are involved is also consistent with the corporate character theory. An otherwise
effective program is unlikely to become part of the organizational decision-making process if it is
clear that policy-making officials in the organization do not respect it. Similarly, the involvement
of "substantial authority personnel" merits the Guidelines' presumption that an organization's
program is ineffective. Such personnel can have de facto authority to make organizational policy,
but they do not always have it. The ability to rebut the presumption that the program is
ineffective permits the organization to demonstrate that this is the case. Where the participation of
substantial authority personnel is particularly likely to result in violations, that is. where it is
"pervasive," the organization will probably not succeed in such a rebuttal.
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provision of correctional treatment, and restitution. 2 " Four of these correspond
roughly to the traditionally-cited aims of sentencing: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation and rehabilitation. As shown in Parts I and II, corporate
criminal law has customarily ignored culpability and emphasized deterrence at
the expense of other purposes of sentencing. Even early drafts of the
Guidelines took such an approach. By making culpability a central feature of
organizational sentencing, in contrast, the final version of the Guidelines is able
to serve the full range of sentencing aims.
1. Retribution/JustDeserts
As noted in Part I, the retributivist school believes that one of the
primary aims of punishment is to assign blame and give offenders their "just
deserts." At the heart of the just deserts theory is the "principle of proportionality," which states that, other things being equal, offenders should be punished in proportion to the degree of their culpability.245-Retribution has not been
an aim of corporate criminal law for an obvious reason: The law lacked a
coherent concept of corporate culpability. Without culpability, an offender is
not blameworthy and does not "deserve" to be punished. Once a theory of
corporate culpability has been developed, however, it becomes possible to
sentence corporate offenders according to their "just deserts."
Although "just deserts" is not the only, or even the most important,
objective of the organizational guidelines, it is clear that it played a role in their
formulation. Section 3552(a)(2) of the United States Code Title 18 specifically
cites "just punishment" as one of the goals of the Federal Guidelines, and legislative history makes clear that Congress understood "just punishment" to
mean "just deserts." 246 Explanations of the Commission's work suggest an
awareness that some organizations deserve greater punishment than others
for the same crime and a desire that organizations not be given more punishment than they deserve. The Supplementary Report explains:
[A]n organization should be given the opportunity to establish that it

was in fact less culpabli than the guidelines presumed. For example,

the guidelines should permit an organization a reduction if it demon-

strates that the offense was caused by a rogue employee rather than at
the direction or with the tacit approval of management. 47
This chance is all the more important, the Commission hints, because the
248
respondeat superior theory employed at the trial stage ignores culpability.
Discussion at the draft stage of the Guidelines also reveals a concern with just
244.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (a)(7). Section 3553(a)(6) also emphasizes "the need to

246.

S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3875 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.

avoid unwanted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct." But this is less a purpose of sentencing than a criterion of a
good sentence.
245. See supra text accompanying note 44.
3182, 3258.
247. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 7, at A-2.
248. Id. at 6. ("Because an organization is vicariously liable for actions taken by its
agents, the Commission determined that the base fine, which measures the seriousness of the
offense, should not be the sole basis for determining an appropriate sentence. Rather, the
applicable culpability score, which is determined primarily by the steps taken by the organization
prior to the offense to prevent and detect criminal conduct, the level, etc., also influences the
determination of the fine range.")
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deserts. At the October, 1988 discussion, for example, several commentators
urged the Commission to recognize a retributive rationale for corporate criminal law.249
Even if the just deserts theory was not a primary motivation for the
Commission, however, it is clear that the Guidelines' fine provisions are consistent with a retributive objective. Instead of making fines dependent solely
on the seriousness of the crime, the Guidelines require sentencing judges to
calculate and incorporate the organization's "culpability score." The culpability
score, in turn, is founded on a genuine and coherent theory of organizational
culpability, a version of the corporate character theory. The end result of the
Guidelines' fine provisions is thus the adoption of the principle of proportionality. Under the Guidelines, organizations are punished in proportion to their
blameworthiness-that is, to the extent they deserve.
2. Incapacitationand Rehabilitation
Like retribution, neither incapacitation nor rehabilitation has been a
traditional aim of corporate criminal law. Both objectives have been frustrated
by an impoverished understanding of corporate culpability. If corporate crimes
are solely the product of individual employees, it makes no sense to incapacitate or rehabilitate corporations. Corporate incapacitation and rehabilitation
are reasonable objectives only if the corporate entity itself is viewed as
responsible for corporate crimes. Moreover, pursuit of both objectives requires
a well-developed theory of organizational character. Organizational incapacitation has been impeded by the fact that organizations have "no body to kick,"
and thus cannot be imprisoned. Insight into the workings of the corporate
character suggests ways to incapacitate other than the traditional physical
deprivation of liberty. Similarly, rehabilitation is essentially a reformation or
rebuilding of character, and a clear understanding of corporate character is
necessary to determine what sort of rehabilitative measures will be effective.
Giving organizational culpability a central role and adopting the corporate
character theory enables the Guidelines to pursue both the incapacitation and
the rehabilitation of organizations.
The Guidelines meet the objective of incapacitation in two ways. First,
they provide for the permanent incapacitation of "criminal purpose organizations" by mandating fines large enough to divest such organizations of all their
assets.250 Second, through provisions authorizing "preventive probation," they
empower the court to intrude upon the decision-making processes of
organizational offenders and to deprive them of liberty. Organizational offenders may be forced to submit to periodic examination of their books and
records and interrogation of their personnel. 251 They may be required to
develop and implement a program to prevent and detect violations of the law,
and the court may closely supervise them to ensure that this requirement is
carried out.252 Additional conditions of probation are authorized by a catch-all

249. See, e.g., Testimony of Gary Lynch, Harry First, and John Coffee, Public Hearings
on the July, 1988 Discussion Draft, October 11, 1988 (on file with author).

250.
251.

252.

Id. § 8C1.1.
Id. § 8C1.L, cmt., backg'd.
Id. § 8D1.4(c).
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provision. 253 The main thrust of the Guidelines' probation provisions, however,
is rehabilitative. 254 Consistent with the corporate character theory, their
ultimate goal is to change the structures, procedures, and decision-making
processes of the organization in order to reform its character. As one would
expect, the preventive probation provisions come into play primarily in
situations in which the organizational character is most in need of reform:
where the organization has fifty or more employees and lacks a program to
prevent and detect crime; where the organization, or a high-level official
involved in the offense within the organization, recently engaged in similar
criminal misconduct; or where probation was ordered because it was
"necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce
the likelihood of future criminal conduct." 255 The objective of rehabilitation is
reinforced by the culpability score, which gives organizations an incentive to
reshape the organizational character before violations of the law occur.
3. Deterrence
Although the Guidelines add retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
to the traditional list of organizational sentencing objectives, they do not abandon the aim of deterrence. Commentary and explanation from the Commission
repeatedly emphasize the deterrence objective. However, the adoption of the
corporate character theory enables the Guidelines to pursue a broader form of
deterrence than has been usual in corporate criminal law.-Traditional organizational sentencing treated the organization as an inscrutable "black box."
Fines, the punitive weapon of choice, were intended to effect changes within
the box, but no effort was made to examine its inner workings. The Guidelines
continue to rely on fines and other monetary payments to deter organizational
crime. In addition, however, probation provisions .threaten offenders with judicial intervention in the decision-making processes of the organization. This
strategy is made possible by the adoption of a theory of organizational crime
that recognizes the role of the policies, customs and procedures of the organization.
Because the Guidelines' fine provisions offer a lighter sentence for
organizations that are less culpable, some commentators have argued that
they will deter less effectively than uniform fines. In particular, critics have
argued that the Guidelines should not provide a mitigation credit for an effective program to prevent and detect crime.256 As noted in Part I, the provision
of an excuse or justification at the trial stage can undermine deterrence in the
"crass" sense by increasing the likelihood of deception and placing a heavier
253. Id. § 8D1.3(c). (The court may impose other conditions of probation provided they
are "I) reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and
characteristics of the organization and 2) involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as
are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing.")
254.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 7, at

5.

255. U.S.S.G. § 8D1.4(c). The Guidelines authorize these conditions of probation when
probation is ordered under (3), (4), (5), or (6) of § 8D1.1(a), suggesting that they are not
authorized if none of these conditions obtain. However, the Guidelines do not say explicitly that
they are not authorized under other conditions, and condition (6) provides the sentencing judge
with a tremendous amount of discretion in deciding to impose these conditions.
256. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Why the Commission's ProposalIs Not GoodEconomics,
3 FED. SENT. R. 138, (NovJDec. 1990); Parker, CorporateSentencing Proposals,supra note
178, at 135.

796

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 34

burden on prosecutors. 257 A mitigating factor at the sentencing stage creates
similar uncertainty and makes it less likely that offenders will be suitably
punished.
An assessment of the deterrent efficacy of the Guidelines is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing briefly to two reasons
why the mitigation credit for a compliance program is not inconsistent with
effective deterrence. First, providing an incentive for organizations to develop
compliance programs makes it possible for the Guidelines to tailor the remedy
directly to the problem of corporate crime. Without such an incentive-with
only a "stick" instead of a "carrot"--organizations might develop compliance
programs, but the Guidelines would have no control over the way in which
such programs are designed. If the corporate character theory is correct, and
the Guidelines have correctly stated the criteria for an effective program, the
credit for such a program will increase, rather than decrease, deterrence.2 58
Second, as the discussion of deterrence in Part I indicated, the efficacy of the
criminal law depends on more than its crude in terrorem effect. 259 Herbert
Packer and others have argued that much of the deterrent value of criminal
sanctions derives from the stigma of moral blameworthiness they carry and
the perception that they are fair.260 Because it results in lighter punishments for
organizations that are not to blame, the credit for a compliance program may
strengthen deterrence in the broad sense by reinforcing the connection
between morality and corporate criminal law.
CONCLUSION
Although corporations cannot be culpable in the same way that individuals can, this Article has argued that there is a sense in which they may be
"justly held to blame" for the acts of their agents. Corporate crime is not
always the result of individual choice. Often, it is the product of goals, rules,
policies and procedures that are features of the organization as an entity. By
substituting an organizational decision-making process for its agents' individual
autonomy, the corporation shapes and controls their behavior. When this process is likely to result in violations on behalf of the corporation on the part of
its agents, the corporate entity may be said to be at fault.
Corporate criminal law has generally failed to take adequate account of
the culpability of the corporate entity. The principal doctrine of corporate
criminal liability, that of respondeat superior, works by imputing to the corporation the culpability of the agent who committed the crime. The Model Penal
Code's location of corporate culpability in the participation of high managerial
officials is more promising, but ultimately too narrow. The lack of a coherent
theory of corporate culpability at the trial stage results in the risk that some
corporations will be held liable even when they are not culpable, and, conversely, that some culpable corporations will succeed in evading liability. At
257. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
258. Of course, the Guidelines also tailor the remedy to the problem through provisions
on preventive probation. But at this point, the offense has already occurred. If the corporate
character theory is correct, an effective program can really prevent crime before it occurs. An

incentive will thus have the effect of decreasing the overall level of organizational crime.
259.
260.

See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
Id.
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the sentencing stage, failure to recognize corporate culpability has led to an
impoverished vision of the range of sentencing options and of the purposes of
corporate sentencing.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations represent a significant advance over the current treatment of corporate culpability in the criminal law. In a marked departure from tradition, the Guidelines give culpability
an explicit and important role in organizational sentencing. They flesh out the
concept of organizational culpability concretely through the device of the culpability score. The Guidelines employ a version of the most theoretically satisfying of three competing theories of corporate culpability, the "corporate character theory." The theory builds on the insights of organizational scholars by
holding that an organization is culpable when its policies, customs and procedures-features of the organizational character--cause its agents to violate
the law on its behalf. Adopting the corporate character theory, I have argued,
makes it possible for the Guidelines to employ innovative organizational sentencing strategies and to pursue the full range of sentencing aims.
To be sure, the Guidelines are not a perfect embodiment of the corporate character theory. The weight given to post-offense cooperation and
obstruction of justice, for example, is heavier than justified under the theory.
The different treatment of large and small organizations whose high-level or
substantial authority personnel were involved in violations also conflicts with
conclusions that follow from the theory. In addition, there is an arbitrariness to
portions of the Guidelines that is endemic to every attempt to establish brightline rules: Why must similar misconduct have taken place within the timeframes of five and ten years, rather than two and seven? Why does the participation of high-level personnel earn a large company organization five aggravation points, rather than four? The corporate character theory provides little
guidance for these choices. However, changes that would bring the Guidelines
into greater conformity with the corporate character theory involve minor tinkering rather than major revisions. Congress has expressly left room for such
tinkering by providing for periodic amendments to the Guidelines, 261 and it will
become clearer what sort of adjustments are appropriate as the Guidelines
are increasingly applied. In the meantime, the Guidelines are the best
institutional expression of a theory of organizational culpability available in our
legal system. As such, they represent a step toward a fairer, more unified, and
more effective corporate criminal law.

261. 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), (p) (1992) instructs the United States Sentencing
Commission to periodically review and revise the sentencing guidelines, and to submit
amendments to Congress by May 1 each year.

